Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Error: Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waiver, and \u3cem\u3eDominguez Benitez\u3c/em\u3e by Minix, Leanna C.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 74 | Issue 1 Article 11
1-1-2017
Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Error: Guilty Pleas,
Appellate Waiver, and Dominguez Benitez
Leanna C. Minix
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington &
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leanna C. Minix, Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Error: Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waiver, and Dominguez




Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Error: 
Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waiver, and 
Dominguez Benitez† 
Leanna C. Minix∗ 
 I. Introduction .....................................................................552 
 II. Receiving the Guilty Plea .....................................................  
  A. Voluntary and Intelligent Requirement ...................555 
  B. Procedural Requirement: Federal Rule  
   of Criminal Procedure 11...........................................560 
 III. Appealing the Guilty Plea ...............................................562 
  A. Appellate Rights ........................................................562 
  B. Appellate Waivers .....................................................566 
  C. Plain Error Review: Affecting Substantial  
   Rights .........................................................................569 
  D. United States v. Dominguez Benitez: Rule 11  
   and the Objective Test ...............................................572 
 IV. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Application of  
  Dominguez Benitez to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Errors:  
  Where the Confusion Arises ............................................575 
  A. Circuits that Apply Only the Objective Test .............578 
                                                                                                     
 † This Note received the 2016 Law Council Law Review Award for 
outstanding student Note. 
 ∗  Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, 
Class of 2017. I would like to thank the editorial board for their insights and 
dedicated revisions of this work. I further extend my thanks to my faculty 
advisor, Professor John D. King, for his guidance, and to Professor Jonathan 
Shapiro for writing a Comment on this Note. I am indebted to Donald Jeffrey 
and Virginia Theisen of the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia for 
bringing these issues to my attention. I am also sincerely grateful to Professor 
Victoria Shannon Sahani for her invaluable instruction in legal writing. Finally, 
I thank my mother, Carolyn Minix, and my sister, Lillian Minix Janavice, for 
their steadfast support and unwavering confidence in me. 
552 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551 (2017) 
  B. Circuits that Claim to Apply Only the  
   Objective Test ............................................................579 
  C. Circuits that Apply a Voluntariness and  
   Intelligence Inquiry ...................................................586 
 V. Argument for Adopting the Two-Part Inquiry:  
  The Purpose of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and the Effects of  
  Adding the Voluntariness and Intelligence Inquiry .......596 
 VI. Conclusion ........................................................................605 
I. Introduction 
In our modern justice system, over ninety-five percent of 
federal criminal cases result in guilty pleas.1 Guilty pleas are 
often the product of direct bargaining between the prosecutor and 
defense counsel about the charges against the defendant and the 
punishment the prosecution seeks, although a defendant may 
choose to plead guilty without any commitment from the 
prosecution.2 The widespread and commonplace role of guilty 
pleas3 in the criminal justice system has far-reaching effects on 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“Ninety-seven 
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas.”); Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 
2015, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N 4 (June 2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (“Case 
Disposition: In fiscal year 2015 the vast majority of offenders (97.1%) pleaded 
guilty.”). 
 2. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1000 (5th ed. 2009) 
(“[M]ore common is explicit bargaining in which the defendant enters a plea of 
guilty only after a commitment has been made that concessions will be granted 
(or at least sought) in his particular case.”). There are two main types of plea 
bargaining that occur during negotiations with a prosecutor. See 2 JOSHUA 
DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
ADJUDICATION 192 (4th ed. 2006). First, the defendant may agree to plead guilty 
to a lesser charge or the prosecutor may agree to drop a charge entirely (“charge 
bargaining”). Id. Second, the defendant may agree to plead guilty in exchange 
for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a sentence agreed upon by the 
defendant, or the prosecutor may agree not to object to the defendant’s 
requested sentence (“sentence bargaining”). Id. 
 3. This Note uses the terms “guilty plea” and “plea deal” interchangeably 
to indicate a negotiated plea bargain resulting in a guilty plea.  
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the rights of defendants, including the constitutional right to a 
jury trial, the right to counsel, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.4 In particular, appeal waivers prevent a defendant 
from appealing parts of his conviction, often including his 
sentence.5 Because the right to appeal exists in a legal purgatory, 
lingering somewhere above a purely statutory right but not rising 
to the level of a constitutionally guaranteed right,6 appeal 
waivers draw concerns about lack of procedural fairness and 
abuse by prosecutors and defense counsel alike.7 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 118 provides the 
advisements and questions that a judge must include in his 
determination that the defendant is entering a valid guilty plea.9 
Rule 11(b)(1)(N)10 requires that the judge determine on the record 
that the defendant understands he waives his right to future 
appeals.11 This Note advocates that Rule 11(b)(1)(N) is unique 
because it concerns appellate waiver.12 As such, when a judge 
deviates from the rule, the standard of review should not be only 
                                                                                                     
 4. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing the requirements to protect a 
defendant’s constitutional rights when he enters a guilty plea). 
 5. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/opinion/trial-judge-to-appeals-court-
review-me.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Congress gave appeals courts 
the power to review federal sentences to ensure the government applies the law 
reasonably and consistently. Without an appeals court’s policing, the odds go up 
that prosecutors will do neither.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.A (advocating that appellate rights occupy 
a role protected by the criminal justice system). 
 7. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that some degree of due process is 
required within an appeal, although there is no due process right to access the 
appellate process); see also Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 
5 (“Waivers are a common but largely hidden element of plea bargains—which, 
in many federal cases, aren’t really bargains because the power of prosecutors is 
often so much greater than that of the defendants or their lawyers.”). 
 8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.B (recounting the purpose and standards 
under Rule 11 to ensure the guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent). 
 10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.B (examining the effects of appellate 
waiver on a defendant’s ability to appeal constitutional and procedural defects). 
 12. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing the policy concerns behind 
widespread use of appellate waiver). 
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the objective standard articulated in United States v. Dominguez 
Benitez,13 which concerned a different Rule 11 violation.14 
Instead, appellate courts should add a voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry for review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.15  
Many federal circuit courts already conduct the additional 
voluntary and intelligent inquiry when examining Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors.16 However, the circuits lack uniformity in 
articulation and application, such that a split of authority arises 
between the courts over the method of analysis and standard of 
review.17 Without consistency among the circuits, defendants fare 
differently in challenging the enforceability of their appellate 
waivers, which are meant to prevent an appellate court from 
hearing appeals on the merits.18 Expressly adopting the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry alongside the objective 
standard from Dominguez Benitez ensures that the circuits 
reviewing plea hearing colloquies for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors find 
the same showing of prejudice.19  
                                                                                                     
 13. 542 U.S. 74 (2004). 
 14. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the standard in Dominguez 
Benitez alone is insufficient to review Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors, but further noting 
that it may be adequate for review of other Rule 11 errors outside the scope of 
this Note). In Dominguez Benitez, the Court ruled that the defendant had to 
show that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge advised the defendant 
that he could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the government’s 
sentencing recommendation. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 15. See discussion infra Parts IV & V (surveying the various circuits’ 
approaches to the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry and arguing why the 
additional test should be included). 
 16. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C (examining the approaches of the 
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which 
acknowledge or include a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry in plain error 
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV (presenting the muddled approaches of the 
circuits as falling into three general categories: circuits that apply solely the 
objective test, circuits that apply the voluntariness and intelligence examination 
but do not expressly acknowledge it, and circuits that conduct a voluntariness 
and intelligence examination). 
 18. See discussion infra Parts IV & V (analyzing various outcomes under 
the circuits’ inconsistent approaches to appellate waiver). 
 19. See discussion infra Part V (advocating the positive effects and policy 
implications of adopting the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). 
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Part II of this Note develops the landscape of the 
constitutional and procedural requirements for ensuring a 
defendant’s guilty plea is valid.20 Part III examines appellate 
waiver and federal case law on appealing guilty pleas and 
establishes the standards for plain error review of Rule 11 
violations in general.21 Part IV details the various approaches of 
the federal circuit courts regarding review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
errors, with a focus on the circuits that add a voluntary and 
intelligent inquiry to the objective standard of review.22 In Part 
V, this Note advocates that adding a voluntary and intelligent 
inquiry to the objective standard satisfies due process concerns 
and analyzes the effects of implementing such an inquiry.23 Part 
V concludes that adding the voluntariness and intelligence 
inquiry for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations 
ensures that a defendant understands the rights he waives in a 
guilty plea with an appellate waiver.24 
II. Receiving the Guilty Plea 
A. Voluntary and Intelligent Requirement 
The Supreme Court has varied its treatment of guilty pleas 
over the last century, reflecting the progression of the role the 
guilty plea plays in the modern justice system. The Court first 
stated the constitutional requirements for accepting a guilty plea 
pursuant to a plea deal in Kercheval v. United States,25 in which 
                                                                                                     
 20. See discussion infra Part II (noting that appellate rights are safeguards 
meant to protect the defendant’s rights and Congress intended Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
to be the procedural mechanism for that protection). 
 21. See discussion infra Part III (setting up the framework for plain error 
review). 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV (offering the approaches to review). 
 23. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on the due process rights 
guaranteed in the appellate process, even if the right to appeal is not a due 
process requirement). 
 24. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry ensures consistency in outcomes for defendants across the 
circuits). 
 25. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). 
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the Court established the voluntary and intelligent standard.26 
Forty years later, the Court elaborated on the constitutional 
requirements for a guilty plea in the landmark case Boykin v. 
Alabama.27 Under Boykin, an appellate court must find reversible 
error when the record does not reflect that the defendant 
voluntarily and intelligently entered the guilty plea.28 The waiver 
of rights encompassed by a guilty plea cannot be inferred or 
presumed from a silent record because highly protected 
constitutional rights are at stake, including the right to trial by 
jury, the right to confrontation, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination.29 A defendant who enters a guilty plea 
                                                                                                     
 26. See id. at 223 (“[A] plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made 
voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the 
consequences.”). Throughout different jurisdictions, courts refer to the 
“understanding” requirement as “intelligent” or “knowing.” See Mary K. 
Wheeler, Guilty Plea Colloquies: Let the Record Show . . . , 45 MONT. L. REV. 295, 
296 n.5 (1984). By most accounts, the three terms refer to the same 
constitutional standard. See id. (“The concept of understanding has also been 
expressed through use of the terms ‘intelligent’ and ‘knowing.’ Many courts use 
these terms interchangeably.”). 
 27. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“It was error, plain on 
the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea 
without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.”). In 
Boykin, the defendant entered a guilty plea after he was indicted for five counts 
of robbery in Alabama state court. Id. at 239. At the guilty plea hearing, the 
judge did not engage the defendant in colloquy or question him in open court. Id. 
Although the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence imposed by 
the jury, it raised the issue of the constitutionality of the guilty plea colloquy at 
the defendant’s automatic appeal. Id. at 240. Finding that the issue was 
properly before the Court on appeal, it concluded that the judge’s failure to 
engage in colloquy with the defendant required reversal of the defendant’s 
guilty plea because there was no evidence of voluntariness and intelligence on 
the record. Id. at 242. 
 28. See id. at 244 (affirming the Alabama Supreme Court justices who 
dissented at the defendant’s appeal and agreeing that “there was reversible 
error because the record [did] not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and 
understandingly entered his pleas of guilty” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) (Goodwyn, J., 
dissenting)  
We do not say that the trial judge may not accept a plea of guilty in a 
capital case, but if he does so he must see to it, first, that the plea is 
entirely voluntary and that the defendant fully realizes and is 
competent to know the consequences of such a plea. 
(citations omitted). 
 29. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (“We cannot presume a waiver of these 
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inevitably surrenders these constitutional rights.30 Thus, courts 
must pay special attention to whether the waiver is voluntary 
and intelligent. 
Although posited together in Boykin, the voluntariness and 
intelligence requirements have individually garnered their own 
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of each 
concept. In Brady v. United States,31 the Supreme Court 
articulated the standard for voluntariness of a guilty plea as 
a plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments 
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must 
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including 
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises 
that are by their nature improper as having no proper 
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).32 
                                                                                                     
three important federal rights from a silent record.”). In the opinion, the Court 
referenced landmark cases that created constitutional protections for 
defendants under the umbrella of due process, including Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
right to jury trial for serious offenses to states courts), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment applies to states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (deciding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant the privilege against 
self-incrimination). Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.  
 30. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1048–49 (“[I]n the wake of Boykin, 
most jurisdictions revised their procedures for taking pleas so that defendants 
were specifically warned of the constitutional rights lost by entry of a plea other 
than not guilty.”). 
 31. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 32. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 
1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)) (ruling that fear of 
the imposition of the death sentence did not make the defendant’s guilty plea 
involuntary). In Brady, the defendant pleaded guilty under a kidnapping statute 
that allowed a jury to recommend the death penalty if he chose to proceed to 
trial. Id. at 743. Previously, in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the 
Court held that the death penalty portion of the kidnapping statute was 
unconstitutional because it tended to discourage defendants from exercising 
their right to a jury trial for fear of the jury imposing the death penalty. Brady, 
397 U.S. at 746–47. In his petition for relief, Brady argued that every guilty plea 
entered under the kidnapping statute overturned in Jackson should be 
invalidated. Id. at 747. The Court rejected the defendant’s arguments entirely 
and ruled that “a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid 
the possibility of a death penalty.” Id. at 755. Referencing similar language as in 
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As stated in Brady, the “relevant circumstances” surrounding a 
plea are the strongest indicators of whether the defendant 
entered the guilty plea voluntarily.33 Notably, the Court held 
that, even though the defendant’s plea “may well have been 
motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, 
we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently 
made and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission 
of guilt was truthful.”34 The defendant was not subject to threats 
of physical harm or coercion, was appointed competent counsel, 
and was questioned by the judge before the judge accepted the 
plea.35 Combined, these factors satisfied the Court that Brady 
entered his plea voluntarily.36 The Court concluded that, 
although fear of the maximum penalty is a common motivation 
for a defendant to enter a guilty plea, it does not render a guilty 
plea involuntary.37 
                                                                                                     
Kercheval, the Court described a plea as “more than an admission of past 
conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be 
entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.” 
Id. at 748.  
 33. See id. at 749 (“The voluntariness of Brady’s plea can be determined 
only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”). Although 
plea bargaining occurred under the table in the past, “today the prevailing 
practice is for the voluntariness inquiry to include a determination of whether a 
plea agreement has been reached and, if so, what it is.” See LAFAVE ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 1043 (providing an overview of the voluntariness inquiry the court 
performs to accept the defendant’s guilty plea pursuant to a plea deal). 
 34. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758. 
 35. See id. at 749 (summarizing why the record established the defendant’s 
voluntariness). 
 36. See id. (examining the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 
decision to enter a guilty plea). The Court further elaborated that the defendant 
had “full opportunity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as 
compared with those attending a plea of guilty” and that “there was no hazard 
of an impulsive and improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage.” 
Id. at 754. Finally, the trial judge’s colloquy in open court was more than 
satisfactory because the judge was “obviously sensitive to the requirements of 
the law with respect to guilty pleas.” Id. at 754–55. 
 37. See id. at 752 (“For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, 
the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are 
obvious—his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin 
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.”). 
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In Henderson v. Morgan,38 the Supreme Court elaborated on 
the intelligence requirement39 and ruled that the defendant must 
possess “a demonstrable understanding of only those elements 
deemed ‘critical’ to a particular offense.”40 Not only was the 
defendant uninformed of the “critical” element of intent for the 
second-degree murder charge to which he pleaded, but there were 
various other circumstantial indications that the defendant did 
not understand the nature of his guilty plea.41 Notably, the 
defendant’s prior classification as a “retarded” prepubescent and 
being only nineteen years old at the time of indictment factored 
heavily into the Court’s evaluation of the defendant’s capacity for 
understanding.42 The Court further examined the role of capacity 
to plead guilty in Godinez v. Moran,43 in which it considered 
whether the same standard for competency applies for standing 
trial, waiving counsel, and entering a guilty plea.44 In finding 
                                                                                                     
 38. 426 U.S. 637 (1976). 
 39. Id. at 645 (“[T]he plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it 
constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the 
defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him . . . .” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The defendant in Henderson 
was indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to second-degree 
murder. Id. at 638. At sentencing, the defendant testified that he “meant no 
harm to that lady” when he entered her room with a knife and stabbed her. Id. 
at 643. In his petition for habeas corpus relief, the defendant claimed that his 
guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent because he did not know “that 
intent to cause death was an element of the offense.” Id. at 639. Because the 
record indicated that the defendant was not informed about all of the “critical” 
elements of the charge to which he pleaded, the Court found that the guilty plea 
was not intelligent and was, therefore, unenforceable. Id. at 647. 
 40. See Julian A. Cook, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule 11: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 602 
(2002) (discussing the scope of Henderson’s effect on the voluntary and 
intelligent requirement). 
 41. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 646 (“There is nothing in this record that 
can serve as a substitute for either a finding after trial, or a voluntary 
admission, that respondent had the requisite intent.”). 
 42. See id. at 641–42 (noting the importance of the defendant’s history of 
delayed mental development and age at the time of offense). 
 43. 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 44. See id. at 398 (“And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a 
profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a 
defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial.”). 
Furthermore, states are free to implement “competency standards that are more 
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that the competency standards were the same, the Court also 
determined that the intelligence requirement mandates that the 
defendant have the capacity to enter a guilty plea.45 
In these landmark cases, the Supreme Court attempted to 
provide clear protections for the defendants’ constitutional rights 
by requiring guilty pleas to be voluntary and intelligent. But even 
after elaboration upon these standards, lower courts still 
struggled to grasp the substance of what it meant for a plea to be 
voluntary and intelligent.46 Consequently, Congress implemented 
procedural safeguards to protect the constitutional and due 
process rights at stake in a guilty plea.47 
B. Procedural Requirement: Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 
Congress enacted Rule 11 in 1944 to create procedural 
requirements for a judge to accept a guilty plea in open court.48 
Rule 11 underwent various changes, although few were notable 
until Congress added the factual basis requirement in 1966.49 
While most guilty pleas involve a waiver of constitutional rights 
and an actual admission of guilt, “the latter element is not a 
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.”50 
                                                                                                     
elaborate . . . [but] the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional 
requirements.” Id. at 402. 
 45. See id. (“[A] trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his 
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”).  
 46. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing cases on appeal in which the 
district courts differed on their determinations of voluntariness and intelligence 
for the guilty plea). 
 47. See discussion infra Part II.B (detailing the procedural requirements 
under Rule 11 for the court’s colloquy at the guilty plea hearing). 
 48. See Cook, supra note 40, at 606 (providing the history of Rule 11); see 
also id. at 606–12 (offering a detailed examination of the Advisory Committee 
notes and amendments over the life of Rule 11). 
 49. See id. at 606 n.52 (discussing the factual basis addition to Rule 11); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court 
must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”). 
 50. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused 
of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime.”). In Alford, the defendant was 
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In North Carolina v. Alford,51 the Court cautioned, however, that 
“the prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas 
should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic 
render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put 
in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to 
preserve.”52  
After confirming the application of the factual basis rule in 
Alford, in 1975 Rule 11 underwent its most dramatic changes in 
light of Boykin v. Alabama.53 The 1975 alterations moved Rule 11 
closer to its appearance today by requiring the judge to address 
the defendant in open court regarding his understanding of the 
charges, adequacy of counsel, constitutional rights, and 
mandatory maximum and minimum penalties.54 Importantly, the 
Rule 11 amendments expressly acknowledged the existence of 
plea bargaining outside of the courtroom and instructed the judge 
on determining whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent in 
direct response to Boykin.55  
Following these amendments, Rule 11’s requirements have 
only lengthened and range today from the constitutional 
advisements referenced in Boykin56 to purely statutory 
information about the mandatory maximum and minimum 
sentences.57 Under Rule 11, a “guilty plea is valid only if it 
                                                                                                     
indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded guilty to second-degree murder 
after considering the overwhelming evidence against him. Id. at 26–27. Alford 
testified at his hearing that he did not commit the crime, but decided to plead 
guilty to avoid a possible death sentence. Id. at 28. The court accepted his plea 
because it found sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the crime, 
despite Alford’s denial. Id. at 37. 
 51. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
 52. Id. at 39. 
 53. See 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (developing the voluntary and intelligent 
requisite for guilty pleas); supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (examining 
Boykin). 
 54. See Cook, supra note 40, at 607–08 (citing Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370) (discussing the 1975 amendments and their effect on 
expanding the role and comprehensiveness of Rule 11 in the guilty plea process). 
 55. See id. at 608–09 (noting that this development was a direct reaction to 
the Boykin voluntariness and intelligence requirement).  
 56. See discussion supra Part II.A (detailing the constitutional 
requirements for guilty pleas). 
 57. See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text (describing particular 
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demonstrates on the record that the defendant has knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.”58 Rule 11(b)(1) 
requires that the judge address the defendant personally in 
open court to inform the defendant, and to determine that the 
defendant personally understands, that the defendant will be 
waiving the following rights by pleading guilty: (1) the right 
not to plead guilty; (2) the right to a jury trial; (3) the right to 
be represented by counsel; (4) the nature of the charge to 
which the defendant is pleading; (5) any mandatory minimum 
penalty; (6) any maximum possible penalty; (7) the defendant’s 
waiver of certain appeal rights; and (8) the government’s right 
to use the defendant’s statements in a perjury prosecution.59 
Only when the court is satisfied that the defendant understands 
each of these advisements and voluntarily waives these rights 
may the judge accept the guilty plea.60 
III. Appealing the Guilty Plea 
A. Appellate Rights 
The Supreme Court has never expressly recognized a 
constitutional right to appeal in criminal or civil cases.61 The 
                                                                                                     
Rule 11 requirements). 
 58. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
666 (2008) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is designed to accomplish 
this goal.”). 
 59. Id. Of all the advisements in Rule 11, these eight advisements are the 
most relevant for the scope of a defendant’s appeal and the discussion in this 
Note. 
 60. See id. (analyzing the Rule 11 procedure for colloquy to accept the 
guilty plea in open court). 
 61. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
1219, 1222 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s avoidance of ruling on the 
constitutional requirements for appellate rights). Furthermore, the Court has 
stated in dicta that there is no due process requirement that the states or the 
federal government must provide for a right of appeal. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“[T]here is of course no constitutional right to 
appeal . . . .”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“It is true that a State is 
not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to 
appellate review at all.”); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither 
is the right of appeal essential to due process of law.”); McKane v. Durston, 153 
U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (ruling that due process does not require access to appeal). 
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Court’s avoidance is in part due to the fact that the federal courts 
and almost every state court system provide for some level of 
appeal as of right.62 Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
recognize a constitutional requirement for appellate rights, the 
Court has opined on the degree of due process required when a 
statute or state constitution set forth an appeals process.63 The 
Supreme Court’s attention to the prophylactic role of the right to 
appeal reveals that it is an essential element of the modern 
American justice system within the constitutional purview of due 
process.64  
Appeals may arise from various procedural postures and 
causes of action after a criminal conviction. Defendants can file for 
appeal regarding issues from trial that resulted in conviction;65 the 
sufficiency of the evidence;66 the enforceability of a guilty plea;67 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 1222 n.8 (noting that at least the 
states of New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Virginia do not require automatic 
appeals as a matter of right for certain defendants). In most states and the 
federal court system, appeals are provided under state constitutional or 
statutory requirements. See id. at 1222. 
 63. See infra notes 250–252 and accompanying text (claiming that although 
the Court has ruled there is no due process guarantee to access the appellate 
process, due process does guarantee certain aspects of an appeal if one is 
provided, including the right to effective assistance of counsel and appointment 
of counsel for direct appeal). 
 64. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the modern American court 
system places heavy importance on the right to appeal and has shaped itself 
according to the premise that a defendant has access to the appellate process). 
 65. A defendant can appeal a multitude of issues if they were raised or 
argued at the trial level, including but not limited to allegations of Fourth 
Amendment violations committed by the state to obtain evidence; Sixth 
Amendment challenges regarding the right to confrontation of witnesses; 
challenges to discrimination during jury selection; and violations of disclosure 
requirements of discovery material. See generally CHEMERINKSY & LEVENSON, 
supra note 58 (presenting the legal foundation for appealable issues in 
investigating and adjudicating criminal cases).  
 66. On appeal, a defendant may argue that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction and that the prosecution did not carry its burden of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 319 (1979) (stating the inquiry for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt”). 
 67. See discussion infra Part IV (presenting the different approaches of the 
federal circuits when deciding whether to enforce appellate waiver in a 
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the defendant’s sentence;68 and habeas corpus and post-conviction 
(“collateral attack”) relief.69 Each of these paths has varying 
effects on an appeal because the underlying issues may require 
shifts in the burden framework or reliance on different 
presumptions.70 
The effect of a guilty plea on a defendant’s ability to appeal is 
generally that it bars the defendant from raising constitutional 
                                                                                                     
defendant’s appeal from a guilty plea). 
 68. A defendant can also appeal his sentence under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines if he believes the court miscalculated his guideline range based on 
factors influencing his offense level, including his criminal history, or if he can 
show that the judge exceeded the maximum range in the guidelines without 
cause. See CHEMERINKSY & LEVENSON, supra note 58, at 817 (discussing the 
revolution of federal sentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and its progeny). 
 69. A defendant may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he has 
been convicted of a crime and exhausted all other possible appellate routes. Id. 
at 921. Historically, a writ of habeas corpus is a mechanism for releasing a 
prisoner from unlawful detention by the state. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL 
COURTS 571–73 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that if the court grants the writ, the state 
must release the defendant from custody). Defendants that file for habeas 
corpus relief are often already incarcerated and petition the court to show there 
is no “lawful basis for depriving the prisoner of liberty.” See id. at 571 (“[T]he 
federal court focuses exclusively on the legal validity of the prisoner’s current 
detention.”). Because federal courts lack the jurisdictional grant to directly 
review state cases, a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus is a separate 
civil suit for “collateral relief.” See id. at 572 (illuminating the technical 
language surrounding habeas corpus and collateral review). The federal courts 
can also entertain motions from federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which 
is almost the only route for a federal prisoner to pursue collateral review. See id. 
at 572–73 (claiming that today, the “only practical difference” posed by Section 
2255 is that a federal prisoner files his petition in the sentencing court, as 
opposed to the district court closest to the penitentiary). 
 70. See id. at 572–73 (noting that the most prevalent distinction in the 
types of appeals is the difference between direct review (often of sentencing) and 
collateral relief). For the purposes of the ongoing discussion, these paths to 
appeal will be treated the same because this Note focuses on the standard of 
review once the appeal has been granted. Whether the appeal is founded in 
direct review, collateral relief, or Section 2255 is immaterial because this Note 
proposes a standard of review applicable to any of these procedural postures 
when the defendant challenges his appeal waiver. See Parts IV & V (noting 
when procedural posture is inconsequential). Footnotes will denote when it is 
necessary to distinguish the procedural history that led to an appeal and why 
such a distinction is required (e.g., when the court distinguished the petitioner’s 
case because it arose from a habeas corpus petition, as opposed to a direct 
appeal of conviction or sentencing). 
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issues that he may have successfully appealed after conviction at 
trial.71 In McMann v. Richardson,72 the Court ruled that the 
defendants could not appeal constitutional issues not raised at 
trial.73 Because the defendants admitted their guilt in open court, 
they were convicted based upon their admissions, not their 
coerced confessions.74 The Court carved out an exception to this 
rule in Blackledge v. Perry75 and determined that a prosecutor’s 
abuse of discretion in charging a defendant could be raised after 
the defendant entered a guilty plea.76 The effects of the McMann 
and Blackledge lines of cases are still disputed.77 It is essential, 
                                                                                                     
 71. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1063 (describing the consequences 
of a guilty plea on the defendant’s right to appeal constitutional issues). 
 72. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 73. See id. at 773 (rejecting the defendants’ constitutional claims). 
 74. See id. (deciding that the defendants were not entitled to relief because 
their coerced confessions were never submitted to a jury and were, therefore, 
“not the basis for the judgment”); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 
267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court 
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”). 
 75. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 (1974) (“Due process of law 
requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into North 
Carolina’s two-tiered appellate process.”). In Blackledge, the defendant was 
convicted in the district court of a misdemeanor and appealed his sentence to 
the superior court. Id. at 22. Under North Carolina law, a defendant could 
appeal his district court conviction and receive a trial de novo in the superior 
court. Id. After the defendant filed the notice of appeal, the prosecutor obtained 
a grand jury indictment for felony charges based on the same conduct for which 
the defendant was convicted in the district court. Id. at 23. The Court agreed 
that if the “prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such 
appeals—by ‘upping the ante’ through a felony indictment whenever a convicted 
misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy—the State can insure 
that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial.” 
Id. at 27–28. 
 76. See id. at 28 (“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his 
statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will 
retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus 
subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.”); 
discussion infra Part V (discussing Supreme Court precedent establishing due 
process rights in the appeals process, despite the Court’s refusal to acknowledge 
a due process right to appeal). 
 77. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1064 (discussing subsequent cases 
in which the Court evaluated whether a defendant could pursue his appeal on 
constitutional grounds). 
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however, to note that constitutional issues arising after the 
defendant enters a guilty plea are distinguishable from “defects 
in the procedure by which the plea was received or circumstances 
making the plea other than voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.”78 Therefore, while a defendant’s guilty plea may 
generally bar constitutional issues from appeal, courts examine 
procedural issues affecting the validity of the guilty plea under a 
different standard of review on appeal.79 
B. Appellate Waivers 
Appeal waivers are express provisions in plea agreements 
that require the defendant to waive his right to future appeal for 
issues that arose at trial or for review of sentencing.80 Federal 
circuits, and even district courts, differ when considering which 
terms are standard for plea deals and what requirements are 
included in an appeal waiver.81 The debate over the increased 
popularity and use of appellate waivers in guilty pleas involves 
weighing norms of the American justice system; most 
importantly, this includes balancing efficiency and fairness.82 
Appeal waivers have been uniformly upheld as constitutional by 
all of the circuits;83 in cases in which a court struck down an 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. at 1067 (noting the differences between constitutional and 
procedural grounds for appeal). 
 79. See discussion infra Part III.C (providing the foundation of plain error 
review of Rule 11 errors during guilty plea colloquy). 
 80. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future 
of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 211 (2005) (presenting the appeal waiver 
as a method of regulating sentencing in the post-Booker and Blakeley guidelines 
framework, which made the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory). 
 81. See id. at 211 (“Scholars and litigants disagree about what is waived, by 
whom, at what price, and how often.”). 
 82. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1002 (“[A] concern expressed about 
the plea negotiation system is that, by its nature, it is likely to produce unfair or 
inaccurate results.”). 
 83. See Cook, supra note 40, at 629 (noting that every circuit has upheld 
the validity of appellate waivers); see also Michael O’Shaughnessy, Appellate 
Review of Sentences, 88 GEO. L.J. 1637, 1637–38 (2000) (discussing the circuits 
that affirm the constitutionality of the appeal waivers). 
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appeal waiver, the court typically found the waiver unenforceable 
for a specific reason.84 
Historically, the debate over the benefits and costs of 
enforcing appellate waivers intensified under the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (the Act)85 because appellate review “emerged 
as the primary enforcement mechanism for sentencing reform in 
federal courts.”86 In particular, the practice of “fact bargaining” 
escalated under the Act, in which prosecutors and defendants 
negotiate stipulations about the facts of a case or the defendant’s 
criminal history that the court would usually determine.87 The 
purpose of the stipulations is for the court to use them to 
sentence the defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“the Guidelines”).88 However, the prosecution often requires the 
defendant to waive his appellate rights in return for beneficial 
                                                                                                     
 84. See discussion infra Part IV (detailing the circumstances under which 
federal circuits have found appellate waivers unenforceable). 
 85. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984) (Added Pub.L. 
98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1988; amended Pub.L. 
101-647, Title XVI, § 1602, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4843; codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §3551(2012)). 
 86. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 214 (arguing that the appeals 
process for guilty pleas is the “glue holding these new presumptive sentencing 
systems together” under the sentencing reform movement). For a discussion of 
sentencing reform in the United States, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. 
Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted 
Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 64 (1993) (“Congress was 
motivated by several primary objectives in enacting sentencing reform 
legislation, but none was more important than increasing fairness and 
uniformity in sentencing.”). From the sentencing reform movement, defendants 
gained the opportunity to raise various sentencing issues on appeal, including 
the factors upon which the judge relied in sentencing. See King & O’Neill, supra 
note 80, at 220–21 (analyzing some of these factors). Prosecutors and courts 
responded by advocating appellate waivers in an effort to conserve resources 
and promote efficiency in sentencing. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on 
the effects that appeal waivers have on efficiency and fairness in the criminal 
justice system). 
 87. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 215–16 (detailing the process of 
fact bargaining in guilty pleas and the concessions the defendant makes). 
 88. See id. at 215 (“[P]arties have manipulated the application of the 
Guidelines through stipulations, expressly resolving sentencing facts and 
Guidelines ‘scoring’ questions as part of the plea agreement.”); id. at 216 (noting 
a benefit to fact bargaining is the higher degree of certainty that results from 
nailing down facts “to obtain specific sentence reductions”). 
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stipulations under the Guidelines.89 Concerns about stipulations 
arise from the argument that “[t]he increased use of stipulations, 
combined with waiver of review, increases the risk that sentences 
not in compliance with the law will proliferate without 
scrutiny.”90 Moreover, the legal exemptions from review of certain 
discretionary decisions by prosecutors have further deteriorated 
the role of appellate review as anticipated by the sentencing 
reform movement.91 
Prosecutors and courts expressed support for appeal waivers 
as the popularity and use of waivers escalated in the 1990s.92 In 
response, Congress amended Rule 11 in 1999 to include a 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 235–36 tbls. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 (“Specifically, as shown in Tables 
2 and 3, those who waived appeal were more likely than nonwaiving defendants 
to receive a promise by the government to seek a safety valve reduction 
(applicable in drug cases only), as well as to actually receive downward 
departures.”). In their study, King and O’Neill conducted interviews with 
various federal prosecutors, defenders, and defendants about appellate waivers. 
See id. at 209–10, 225 (detailing the sampling from which the authors conducted 
their analysis). They also examined data collected from 971 random cases 
sentenced under the federal guidelines. Id. at 209–210. Tables 1–6 show their 
analyses for the types of departures and assistance that benefited defendants 
under the federal guidelines and whether the defendant had waived his 
appellate rights or not. Id. at 235–38. While some of the analysis showed no real 
variance in the defendants’ sentences, the results tended to show that in more 
than one out of five waiver cases, a defendant received a downward departure 
(other than substantial assistance). Id. at 238. Only one out of ten nonwaiver 
defendants received the same treatment, reflecting a double rate of assistance 
for waiving defendants. Id. 
 90. See id. at 213 (echoing opponents’ concerns about widespread use of 
blanket waivers). 
 91. See id. at 218 (claiming federal laws that prevent review of 
discretionary decisions has weakened appellate review). Specifically, the 
inability to review prosecutorial discretion includes: downward departures for a 
defendant’s cooperation (see id. at 218 n.38 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004))), safety valve motions for imposing a sentence below 
the minimum (see id. at 218 n.39 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)–(f) (2000))), 
reduction under Rule 35 for substantial assistance (see id. at 218 n.40 (citing 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b))), and reduction for accepting responsibility (see id. at 218 
n.41 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004))). 
 92. See id. at 221–24 (noting that in a Federal Judicial Center survey, over 
60% of responding circuit and district federal judges advocated using appeal 
waivers “more frequently”) (citing MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. 
GILBERT, FED. JUD. CTR., THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 22 tbl.14 (1997), 
http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/gssurvey.pdf). 
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requirement for the court to discuss appeal waivers when 
accepting a guilty plea.93 The amendment arguably sanctioned 
the use of appeal waivers in plea agreements by giving “the green 
light” for widespread use of such waivers.94 Today, prosecutors 
frequently include appeal waivers in guilty pleas, and many 
public defenders fight tooth and nail to refuse the waiver unless 
the client receives a heavy concession.95 Still, the popularity of 
appeal waivers cannot be denied and their effects on sentencing 
have a heavy influence on sentencing policy in our justice 
system.96 
C. Plain Error Review: Affecting Substantial Rights 
The contemporaneous objection rule demands that the 
defendant object at the trial level to preserve his argument for 
appeal.97 Under this requirement, if the defendant “fail[s] to 
make timely assertion of the right,” he forfeits the ability to make 
that argument on appeal.98 The purpose of the rule is to allow the 
court to correct errors on the record at the time they are made 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. at 224 n.63 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 106-55, at 13 (1999) (Conf. 
Rep.)). The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure believed it 
was appropriate to recognize what was apparently already taking place in a 
number of jurisdictions and to formally require trial judges in those jurisdictions 
to question the defendant about whether his or her waiver was made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently. Additional amendments were adopted by the 
Court by order dated April 26, 1999, transmitted to Congress by the Chief 
Justice on the same day (526 U.S. 1189; Cong. Rec., vol. 145, pt. 6, p. 7907, Ex. 
Comm. 1788; H. Doc. 106–55), and became effective December 1, 1999. The 
amendments affected Rules 6, 11, 24, and 54. Id.  
 94. See King & O’Neill, supra note 80, at 224 (“[W]hen the amendment 
went into effect in 1999, it was the green light some prosecutors and judges had 
been waiting for.”). 
 95. See id. at 233–34 nn.84–90 (describing the types of concessions public 
defenders demand from prosecutors). 
 96. See discussion infra Part V (examining the policy consequences of 
enforcing an appellate waiver despite the defendant’s lack of understanding 
about its effects on his sentence). 
 97. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (requiring the 
defendant preserve his issue by timely objecting). 
 98. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (providing for the 
timely objection requirement). 
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and to prevent “sandbagging.”99 On appeal, a federal court may 
consider a defendant’s unpreserved objection if the court finds 
that the error at the trial level constituted “plain error.”100 In 
United States v. Olano,101 the Court established a four-prong test 
for plain error review.102 First, there must be an error, which is 
“[d]eviation from a legal rule . . . unless the rule has been 
waived.”103 Second, the error must also be “plain,” where “[p]lain 
is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’”104 The third 
limitation on review is that the error must “affect substantial 
rights,” meaning “in most cases . . . that the error must have been 
                                                                                                     
 99. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 384. The rule aims to prevent the 
defense tactic of “sandbagging,” in which 
defense counsel could choose not to object to an error during the trial 
and thereby achieve a no-lose situation: If the client was acquitted 
despite the error, the Double Jeopardy Clause would assure that he 
could not be retried; if the client was convicted, he could raise the 
error on appeal to gain a new trial. 
Id. The implications from sandbagging run further afoul in appellate review of 
unpreserved errors because without plain error review, the presumption is 
always on the government to prove there was no prejudice. See United States v. 
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 73 (2002) 
[A] defendant could choose to say nothing about a judge’s plain lapse 
under Rule 11 until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which 
time the burden would always fall on the Government to prove 
harmlessness. A defendant could simply relax and wait to see if the 
sentence later struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule 11 silence 
would have left him with clear but uncorrected Rule 11 error to place 
on the Government’s shoulders. 
 100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Rule 52(b) governs unpreserved errors on appeal; 
it states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”  
 101. 507 U.S. 725 (1993). In Olano, the Court stated that Rule 24(c) was 
meant to protect the intrusion principle, which is that a jury’s deliberations 
should be conducted in secrecy to prevent any outside influence on its decision. 
Id. at 738. There was insufficient evidence for the Court to find that the 
presence of the alternate jurors prejudiced the defendant’s outcome under Rule 
24(c) and the intrusion doctrine. Id. at 739. The Court determined that, 
although the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was a 
deviation from Rule 24(c), the defendant did not meet his burden of 
demonstrating that the error affected his substantial rights under the four-
prong test. Id. at 741. 
 102. See id. 736–37 (summarizing the purpose of the four-prong test). 
 103. Id. at 732–33. 
 104. Id. at 734. 
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prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.”105 Finally, the “court of appeals should correct a 
plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”106 Much of the Court’s jurisprudence 
involving the Olano test for plain error focuses on the third prong 
of “affecting substantial rights” because this step requires the 
defendant to bear the burden of showing why he was prejudiced 
by the error.107 In United States v. Vonn,108 the Court applied the 
                                                                                                     
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). The fourth prong 
illuminates the permissive, not mandatory, nature of plain error. A court may 
correct plain error if it satisfies the test, but it is not required to do so. See id. at 
736–37 (noting that while “[a]n error may seriously affect the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s 
innocence,” a court retains discretion over correcting the error on appeal 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 107. See id. at 735 (“Normally, although perhaps not in every case, the 
defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting 
substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b).”). The Court noted that “[i]t is the 
defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with 
respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the 
forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.” Id. at 
734. The Court compared the burden shifting to the standard of harmless error 
under Rule 52(a), which applies when the defendant preserved the error 
through timely objection. See id. at 734 (“When the defendant has made a timely 
objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a court of appeals normally engages 
in a specific analysis of the district court record—a so-called ‘harmless error’ 
inquiry—to determine whether the error was prejudicial.”). 
 108. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (ruling that Rule 11 
errors are subject to review under the plain error standard articulated in Olano 
and under Rule 52(b)). In Vonn, the defendant did not object at the guilty plea 
hearing when the judge failed to advise him that he had a right to an attorney if 
he chose to go to trial, violating Rule 11. Id. at 60. On appeal from his guilty 
plea, the defendant asked the court to set aside his convictions. Id. at 61. Rule 
11(h) states that “any variance from the procedures required by this rule which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h). 
The Court determined that while Rule 11(h) echoed the Rule 52(a) standard for 
harmless error, the fact that Congress did not give Rule 11(h) a counterpart 
similar to that of Rule 52(b) did not implicate that Rule 11 was not subject to 
plain error review. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 66. Additionally, the Court ruled that 
when conducting plain error review, an appellate court may examine the entire 
record to determine whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights. Id. at 74. There was evidence on the record that Vonn affirmed in at least 
two other proceedings that he understood his rights and even signed a 
statement admitting as much, satisfying the Court that the defendant 
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four-prong test for plain error to Rule 11 error when the 
defendant or his counsel did not object at the hearing.109 Vonn 
confirmed that plain error review under Olano and Rule 52(b) 
applied to Rule 11 errors in general;110 still, it left unanswered 
questions about prejudice and substantial rights in the Rule 11 
context of appeal of guilty pleas with appellate waivers.  
D. United States v. Dominguez Benitez: Rule 11 and the Objective 
Test 
In United States v. Dominguez Benitez,111 the Court 
attempted to confront the issues left open in Vonn about plain 
error review of unpreserved Rule 11 violations.112 In Dominguez 
Benitez, the defendant entered a plea deal in which he pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of 
methamphetamine, and the government dismissed a charge for 
possession of methamphetamine.113 The parties also agreed that 
Dominguez would receive a safety valve reduction in sentencing, 
which authorized a sentence below the statutory minimum.114 For 
the court to give the defendant the safety valve reduction, the 
judge had to find that the defendant satisfied five factors 
regarding the defendant and his history.115 The agreement 
further stated that the trial court was not bound to the plea 
                                                                                                     
understood his right to counsel at trial. Id. at 75. 
 109. See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 66 (applying the four-prong plain error review 
standard to determine that the defendant was not prejudiced by the Rule 11 
error). 
 110. See id. at 63 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that plain error 
review is inapplicable to Rule 11 errors because Congress did not intend to 
eliminate the contemporaneous objection requirement). 
 111. 542 U.S. 74 (2004). 
 112. See id. at 81–82 (performing the objective analysis under the 
reasonable probability standard and concluding that the defendant would not 
have changed his guilty plea had the court advised him on the record that it did 
not have to adhere to the sentencing guidelines). 
 113. Id. at 77; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing 
background on the types of charges and sentencing bargaining frequently used 
by both parties to accomplish a plea deal). 
 114. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 77.  
 115. Id. at 78. 
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deal.116 Without the safety valve reduction, Dominguez faced a 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum 
sentence of life in prison.117 At the guilty plea hearing, the trial 
court gave all of the Rule 11 advisements except it failed to advise 
the defendant under Rule 11(c)(3)(B) that he could not withdraw 
his plea if the court did not accept the government’s sentencing 
recommendation.118 The defendant did not make a timely Rule 11 
objection to the colloquy error.119  
When the probation officer reviewed the presentence report, 
it revealed that Dominguez had not disclosed all of his convictions 
and was subsequently ineligible for the safety valve reduction in 
sentencing.120 The trial court sentenced the defendant to the 
mandatory minimum of ten years.121 Dominguez appealed and 
argued that, under Vonn, the Rule 11 error affected his 
substantial rights.122 The Ninth Circuit required Dominguez to 
“prove that the court’s error was not minor or technical and that 
he did not understand the rights at issue when he entered his 
guilty plea.”123 The circuit court considered Dominguez’s inability 
to speak English and the assurances of both the prosecutor and 
his own counsel that he would probably receive the safety-valve 
reduction as persuasive evidence that the defendant’s substantial 
rights were affected.124  
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the narrow 
question of “what showing must thus be made to obtain relief for 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 76; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B) (“To the extent the plea 
agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the 
defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does 
not follow the recommendation or request.”); see also United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (ruling that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not 
mandatory and a judge is not required to follow them for sentencing). 
 119. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 78 (2004).  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 79. 
 123. Id. (quoting United States v. Benitez, 310 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
 124. Id.  
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an unpreserved Rule 11 failing.”125 In response, the Court held 
that a “defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a 
guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain 
error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for the error, he would not have entered the plea.”126 Under the 
plain error relief rule, “a defendant must thus satisfy the 
judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, 
that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.”127 This showing 
satisfied the requirement that the defendant prove that the Rule 
11 error affected his substantial rights by demonstrating that the 
error was prejudicial to the outcome of his case.128 The Court 
determined that the trial court’s Rule 11 error did not affect the 
outcome because the written plea agreement warned the 
defendant that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused 
the government’s recommendation, the defendant signed the 
written agreement, and there was evidence the court informed 
the defendant at least twice of his right to counsel at trial.129 The 
Court noted, however, that  
when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by guilty 
plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights 
he was putatively waiving, the conviction must be reversed. 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). We do not suggest 
that such a conviction could be saved even by overwhelming 
evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty 
regardless.130 
While this ruling stated the standard of review for a procedural 
claim of error under Rule 11, Footnote 10 opened the door to an 
appeal based on Boykin. In light of Footnote 10, a defendant could 
argue that he entered his guilty plea involuntarily and 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 76.  
 126. Id. at 83. 
 127. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id. at 81–82. 
 129. Id. at 85.  
 130. See id. at 84 n.10 (acknowledging the voluntariness and intelligence 
requirements for a defendant entering a guilty plea). 
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unintelligently because of a deviation from a Rule 11 advisement 
about the rights he waived.  
IV. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Application of Dominguez Benitez 
to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Errors: Where the Confusion Arises 
Rule 11 has broad implications as a constitutional and 
procedural safeguard because its requirements span from 
advising the defendant that he is waiving constitutional rights131 
to ensuring that he comprehends the role of statutory 
sentencing.132 Since the Supreme Court decided Dominguez 
Benitez, the federal circuit courts have not consistently 
established how the plain error review of a Rule 11(b)(1)(N)133 
error fits with the requirement that the defendant intelligently 
and voluntarily entered the guilty plea.134 Under Olano135 and 
Vonn,136 all of the federal circuit courts are bound to apply the 
reasonable probability standard for plain error review of Rule 11 
                                                                                                     
 131. The judge must advise the defendant of the waiver of constitutional 
rights upon entering a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C) (providing 
waiver of right to a jury trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E) (detailing waiver of 
right against compelled self-incrimination); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E) 
(presenting waiver of right to confront witnesses); discussion supra Part II.B 
(examining the role of Rule 11 as a procedural safeguard). 
 132. The judge must advise the defendant of certain sentencing 
requirements, including mandatory minimum and possible maximums. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H) (advising the defendant of the maximum possible 
penalty); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I) (advising the defendant of the mandatory 
minimum penalty). 
 133. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring that “[b]efore the court 
accepts a plea of guilty . . . , the court must address the defendant personally in 
open court,” and further “inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving 
the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence”). 
 134. See Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn. 2011) 
(“[I]t appears that there is no consensus about how the Rule 11 plain error 
inquiry interacts with the requirement that a waiver of appeal or collateral 
attack rights be knowing and voluntary in the context of challenges under Rule 
11(b)(1)(N).”), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 135. See supra notes 101–107 and accompanying text (discussing Olano and 
the four-prong test for plain error review). 
 136. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text (applying plain error 
review to Rule 11 error in Vonn). 
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violations,137 which the Court further developed in Dominguez 
Benitez.138 
A split of authority among the U.S. courts of appeals arises 
because some reference only the reasonable probability standard 
in the substantial rights analysis of plain error review of Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors.139 Other circuits conduct a voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry that either stands alone as the only standard 
of review or functions in addition to the objective examination.140 
Consequently, the type of Rule 11 error at issue appears to be a 
distinguishing factor for plain error review because, as some 
circuit courts argue, it may make the Dominguez Benitez 
objective standard insufficient for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error 
review.141 These circuits reason that Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations 
                                                                                                     
 137. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (ruling that plain 
error review is applicable for Rule 11 errors and that the defendant bears the 
burden of showing that prejudice resulted from the judge’s error); United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (stating the four-part test for review of plain 
error). 
 138. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)  
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who seeks reversal of his 
conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court 
committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. 
A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, 
informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result 
is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the 
proceeding. 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984)); discussion supra 
Part III.D (detailing the objective standard for plain error review articulated in 
Dominguez Benitez). 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]o justify reversal for a district court’s error in a Rule 11 admonishment, the 
defendant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would 
not have entered the plea.’” (citing Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83)). 
 140. See discussion infra Parts IV.B–C (analyzing federal circuit courts’ 
implied or express applications of a voluntary and intelligence inquiry for 
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors); see, e.g., United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 
529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Our inquiry is not limited, however, to whether there was a technical 
violation of Rule 11. Rather, we must determine whether . . . the 
deficient colloquy affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights by 
precluding him from knowing of and understanding the significance 
of the binding appellate waiver in the plea agreement.  
 141. See, e.g., Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Conn. 
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are distinguishable from other Rule 11 errors because enforcing 
an appellate waiver based upon a record that does not establish 
the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea defeats the 
purpose of Rule 11.142 The circuit split ultimately hinges on 
different inquiries: whether the defendant would have pleaded 
guilty if the judge had not erred during the colloquy or whether 
the defendant understood that he waived the right to appeal.143 
Including an intelligence inquiry alongside or instead of the 
reasonable probability standard for plain error review of a Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) error is a divisive issue among the circuits that 
creates a variance in outcomes when a court must determine the 
enforceability of an appellate waiver.144 
                                                                                                     
2011) (distinguishing Dominguez Benitez by noting that there are “reasons to 
believe that application of the Rule 11 plain error standard to alleged violations 
of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) might not be straightforward”), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 
2014). The scope of this Note focuses on the interaction between the voluntary 
and intelligent requirement and Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violations. The argument that 
Dominguez Benitez is distinguishable from Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors does not 
extend to the extreme conclusion that Dominguez Benitez is only applicable to 
Rule 11(c)(3)(B) errors. See discussion infra Part V (elaborating on why Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors are distinguishable from other types of Rule 11 errors).  
 142. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[The 
defendant] must show that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he would 
not have entered it on the basis of the record as a whole . . . .”). 
 143. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C (comparing the roots of the 
different inquiries). 
 144. See discussion infra Part IV.C (demonstrating the disparity in 
enforcing appellate waivers when courts adopt the secondary voluntary and 
intelligence inquiry). The Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have not issued 
binding opinions on review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors after Dominguez Benitez. 
See infra Part V (presenting the recent decisions in the Tenth Circuit that 
reflect disagreement about review of appellate waiver and noting that the Tenth 
Circuit affirms the use of appellate waiver in general). In 2004, the Ninth 
Circuit amended its 2003 opinion from United States v. Arellano-Gallegos. 387 
F.3d 794 (2004). For the purposes of the circuit discussion in this Note, the 
Ninth Circuit has not issued a sufficient number of opinions to facilitate an 
independent discussion. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 953 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (noting the court “review[s] de novo the question of whether an 
appellant has waived his right to appeal” and finding the appellate waiver 
enforceable (citing United States v. Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 2003)); 
United States v. Alarid, 123 Fed. App’x 294, 295 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
the defendant’s waiver was unenforceable after de novo review of the record 
because the trial court “failed to discuss the specific terms of the waiver and 
ensure Alarid’s understanding as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)”). The 
lack of Ninth Circuit case law on this narrow issue should not undercut the 
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A. Circuits that Apply Only the Objective Test 
The Fifth Circuit alone is faithful to strict application of the 
reasonable probability standard from Dominguez Benitez when 
determining the enforceability of an appellate waiver.145 While 
the Fifth Circuit may engage in a limited fact-specific analysis, it 
systematically evaluates the substance of the plea colloquy only 
to the extent that is required to confirm that the petitioner’s 
substantial rights were not violated.146 In various appeals, the 
court found that sufficient evidence for this level of inquiry 
included that the defendant read the agreement, stated he 
understood the agreement, and signed the agreement.147 If there 
is sufficient evidence on the record that the defendant would not 
have pleaded guilty but for the error, the court does not inquire 
into the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea.148 The Fifth 
                                                                                                     
guidance in Arellano-Gallegos, which merits attention from other circuits for its 
analysis of the defendant’s substantial rights. See infra note 230 (discussing the 
value of the Arellano-Gallegos voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). This Note 
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision as other circuits reference it in their 
opinions. 
 145. See United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 412 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“Moreover, to justify reversal for a district court’s error in a Rule 11 
admonishment, the defendant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, but for 
the error, he would not have entered the plea.’” (quoting United States v. 
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004))); see also United States v. 
Alvarado-Casas, 715 F.3d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that it is sufficient 
under Rule 11 for the trial court to review the plea agreement with the 
defendant and confirm his voluntary signature). 
 146. See United States v. Narvaez, 452 Fed. App’x 488, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam) (unpublished) (“Taken together, the questions asked and 
information provided are sufficient for us to conclude that Narvaez has not 
shown that his substantial rights were violated.”); id. at 493 n.5 (noting that 
had the petitioner raised an involuntariness claim, “such an argument would 
ring hollow” in light of the defendant’s graduate degree and effective counsel). 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Tydus, 574 Fed. App’x 294, 295 (5th Cir. 
2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[The defendant] demonstrated at the 
re-arraignment hearing that he had read and understood the plea agreement, 
which included the appeal waiver, and raised no question regarding that 
provision; therefore, the waiver is valid.”); Oliver, 630 F.3d at 412 (concluding 
that, although the judge did not clarify the context of the appeal waiver under 
the “limited circumstances” in the plea agreement, the colloquy was adequate 
because the defendant indicated he understood and had opportunity to inquire 
further about the provisions in the paragraphs). 
 148. See Narvaez, 452 Fed. App’x at 492–93 (rejecting petitioner’s claim 
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Circuit’s approach to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error review is 
therefore the prototype of the pure harmless error standard 
articulated in Dominguez Benitez because it applies solely the 
objective standard.149 
B. Circuits that Claim to Apply Only the Objective Test 
The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits claim to apply only 
the Dominguez Benitez reasonable probability test to all Rule 11 
violations, including Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors on appeal from a 
guilty plea.150 However, these circuits frequently include a 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry under the guise of the 
procedural analysis that Dominguez Benitez requires.151  
In United States v. Borrero-Acevedo,152 the First Circuit 
determined in a case of first impression that the Dominguez 
Benitez standard for Rule 11 plain error review was directly 
applicable to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.153 The court declined to 
analyze the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea and 
                                                                                                     
because it “rests solely upon the district court’s alleged failure to sufficiently 
ensure that his waiver was informed and voluntary during the plea colloquy”). 
The court noted that when a defendant “claims that he was misled or coerced 
into entering the [plea] agreement, or that he was incompetent when he signed 
the waiver, [he] challenges the validity of the waiver itself, not the Rule 11 
colloquy.” Id. at 491 n.3 (citing United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540 n.9 
(3d. Cir. 2008)). The distinction in the Fifth Circuit is that the Fifth Circuit does 
not identify a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error as constituting grounds to challenge the 
validity of the waiver. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s voluntariness and 
intelligence argument because Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error was subject to plain error 
review). 
 149. See Oliver, 630 F.3d at 412 (stating the Dominguez Benitez standard). 
 150. See infra notes 153, 167, 175 and accompanying text (adopting the 
Dominguez Benitez standard for demonstrating prejudice). 
 151. See infra notes 154, 170, 178 and accompanying text (elaborating on the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). 
 152. 533 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 153. See id. at 13 (“We apply, for the first time, the Supreme Court’s recent 
plain error decisions to a defendant’s unpreserved claim of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
error as to a waiver of appeal clause at the change-of-plea hearing.”); id. at 18 
(“It is defendant’s burden to show that the waiver of appellate rights was 
deficient and that he would otherwise not have pled guilty. If the record 
contains no evidence in defendant’s favor, his claim fails.” (citing United States 
v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004))).  
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stated that “[i]t is not enough to ask whether the defendant 
understood the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea; 
courts must consider the effect of an omitted warning on the 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”154 Relevant factors to 
whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected included 
“the clarity of the plea agreement itself, defendant’s signature on 
the agreement and his attestations, defendant’s statements at the 
change-of-plea hearing, statements by counsel for both the 
defendant and the government at the hearing, and the nature of 
the questioning done by the judge at the hearing.”155 The First 
Circuit importantly attempted to distinguish its ruling from cases 
in the Sixth156 and Ninth157 Circuits by noting that those circuits’ 
interpretations were inconsistent with Vonn and Dominguez 
Benitez.158 Although the court stated its position clearly, it also 
strived to distinguish the facts of Borrero-Acevedo from the facts 
of United States v. Sura.159 In Sura, the Seventh Circuit fell on 
the opposite side of the question of applying Dominguez Benitez to 
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.160 When describing the factual variances 
                                                                                                     
 154. See id. at 16 (echoing the reasonable probability standard). 
 155. See id. at 17 (relying on these factors to determine prejudice to the 
defendant). 
 156. See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to 
enforce the defendant’s appellate waiver after a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error because 
the record did not demonstrate that he voluntarily and intelligently entered the 
plea agreement); infra notes 209–218 and accompanying text (discussing the 
precedential value of Murdock for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
violations). 
 157. See United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 
2004) (establishing the Ninth Circuit’s approach to plain error review of Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) violations under the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry); see also 
infra note 230 (describing the importance of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling). 
 158. See United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2008)  
Some courts have held that where there is no discussion of an 
appellate waiver clause at the plea hearing and there is an absence of 
“any indication on the record that the defendant understood that he 
had a right to appeal and he was giving up that right,” that will 
suffice to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test. This view is, 
we think, inconsistent with both Vonn and Dominguez Benitez. 
(citing Murdock, 398 F.3d at 497; Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d at 797). 
 159. 511 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 160. See discussion infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry as 
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between the cases,161 the court noted that “Borrero has not shown 
that he did not know or understand that he had waived his 
appellate rights or that he would not have pled guilty had he 
realized he was waiving his appellate rights.”162 This statement 
illuminates, unintentionally on the court’s part, the judicial 
instinct to engage in the two-part inquiry, even upon express 
rejection of such an analysis a paragraph earlier.163 The First 
Circuit reiterated the position that the Dominguez Benitez 
standard applies directly to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors in United 
States v. Sotirion.164 But, in that case too, the court again blurred 
the application of the reasonable probability test with a 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry for the procedural 
violation under Rule 11(b)(1)(N).165  
                                                                                                     
complementary to the objective standard). 
 161. See Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 18 (noting that the relevant factors in 
Sura included the petitioner’s old age, diminished mental capacity, labored 
responses to the court’s questions, and current treatment for mental illness, and 
further stating that in the case of Borrero-Acevedo, “[n]othing of the sort exists 
here”). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. See id. (rejecting the voluntary and intelligent analysis adopted in the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits). 
 164. See United States v. Sotirion, 617 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (describing 
the holding in Borrero-Acevedo as establishing the reasonable probability 
standard, which was not “by its terms restricted to particular types of Rule 11 
errors”). 
 165. See id. at 34 (“[T]o establish that the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error affected his 
substantial rights under the third prong of the plain error test, the defendant 
must show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the plea had 
the error not been made.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The 
court attempted to clarify that the defendant can make a voluntary and 
intelligent claim outside of raising a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violation on appeal under 
constitutional principles. See id. at 33 (“First, we require that the defendant 
enter into the waiver ‘knowingly and voluntarily.’”); id. at 34 n.6 (“Plain error 
review would not apply if the defendant challenged the knowing and voluntary 
nature of his appellate waiver on grounds independent of the district court’s 
compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N).”). The court noted, however, that during the 
Rule 11-required colloquy, “the court’s inquiry ‘should be specific enough to 
confirm the defendant’s understanding of the waiver and [his] acquiescence in 
the relinquishment of rights that it betokens.’” Id. at 35 (quoting United States 
v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001)). This statement tends to support 
the two-part inquiry that the First Circuit claimed to reject because it melds the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry from Boykin with the objective analysis of 
Dominguez Benitez. 
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Most recently, the Fourth Circuit emphasized its agreement 
with the First Circuit by applying the reasonable probability test 
to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error in United States v. Murraye.166 Citing 
the rule from Dominguez Benitez, the court found that the 
appellant had not satisfied his burden of establishing that the 
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error affected his substantial rights.167 Still, the 
court ruled that, based on the appellant’s limited education and 
the court’s failure to ensure the defendant’s understanding of the 
plea, the waiver was unenforceable because it was not voluntary 
and intelligent.168 Although intended to take place outside of the 
scope of the plain error review,169 the court’s voluntariness and 
                                                                                                     
 166. See United States v. Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x 219, 220 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(per curiam) (unpublished) (concluding that the defendant did not meet the 
required showing under Dominguez Benitez, but still denying the Government’s 
motion to dismiss the appeal because the appellate waiver was not voluntary 
and intelligent). 
 167. See id. at 227 (“Appellant bears the final burden of showing that the 
plain error in this case affected his substantial rights.”). The court emphasized 
that there were “no statements on the record, at any stage of the trial 
proceedings, demonstrating that Appellant wished to withdraw his guilty plea 
or would have gone to trial but for the errors.” Id. at 228; see also United States 
v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir. 2002) (requiring the defendant to 
“demonstrate that, absent the Rule 11 errors, he would not have entered into his 
plea agreement with the Government”). 
 168. See Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x at 227 (“We must evaluate this issue by 
reference to the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and 
conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and 
familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002))). 
The court specifically noted the defendant’s “limited educational background 
and . . . enroll[ment] in special education classes” in its analysis of the 
circumstances. Id. 
 169. See id. (indicating the totality of the circumstances standard). The 
court’s use of the “totality of the circumstances” context suggests that the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry could have been on constitutional 
grounds instead of procedural. See id. (separating the analysis of Rule 11 errors 
under the reasonable probability standard from the discussion of the 
Government’s motion to dismiss based on the enforceability of the appellate 
waiver); see also United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his right of 
appeal must be evaluated by reference to the totality of the circumstances.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); discussion supra Part II.A 
(discussing Boykin v. Alabama, which allows a defendant to raise the argument 
that his plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent on constitutional grounds, 
independent of procedural error). 
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intelligence inquiry occurred under the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
review.170 The court unified the constitutional and procedural 
inquiries when it stated that “[a]n appellate waiver is not 
knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to 
specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver 
provision of the plea agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and 
the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise 
understand the full significance of the waiver.”171 Because the 
court refused to enforce the waiver given the evidence of the 
defendant’s delayed mental development, it based its decision to 
overturn the conviction on the defendant’s understanding of the 
plea, not the probability of whether the defendant would have 
pleaded differently but for the error.172 Before Murraye, the 
Fourth Circuit inconsistently approached Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
violations by claiming to apply the objective test, but then 
analyzing the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
the record established that the defendant entered the appellate 
waiver voluntarily and intelligently.173 
                                                                                                     
 170. See Murraye, 596 Fed. App’x at 229 (“The district court also never 
asked specifically whether Appellant understood the waiver of his appeal rights. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Appellant’s waiver 
was neither knowing nor intelligent.” (citing Manigan, 592 F.3d at 627)). By 
including the failure to inquire about appellate waiver as a factor of the totality 
of the circumstances, the court blends the constitutional and procedural 
inquiries to conclude that the waiver is unenforceable. See id. at 223 (noting the 
absence of colloquy about the waiver). 
 171. See id. at 229 (citing Manigan, 592 U.S. at 627) (demonstrating the 
court’s reliance on determining whether the defendant actually understood the 
appellate waiver, as opposed to looking at evidence of whether he would have 
pleaded differently but for the errors). 
 172. See id. at 227–29 (ruling that although the defendant did not satisfy 
the Dominguez Benitez showing of a reasonable probability that he would have 
pleaded differently but for the error, the appeal waiver was unenforceable 
because it was not voluntary and intelligently made). 
 173. See Manigan, 592 F.3d at 627 (“[A] waiver is not knowingly or 
voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically question the defendant 
concerning the waiver provision of the plea agreement during the Rule 11 
colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise 
understand the full significance of the waiver.” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The court noted that “[w]hether a defendant knowingly and 
intelligently agreed to waive his right of appeal must be evaluated by reference 
to the totality of the circumstances” and that “[a]n important factor in such an 
evaluation is whether the district court sufficiently explained the waiver to the 
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In United States v. Frook,174 the Eighth Circuit engaged in 
analysis similar to that of the First and Fourth Circuits’ analyses 
by stating that Dominguez Benitez controls the plain error review 
standard with the objective reasonable probability test.175 But the 
court further engaged in fact-specific inquiry that implicated 
voluntary and intelligence constitutional grounds.176 Even as the 
court ruled to uphold the appellate waiver,177 it cautioned that 
                                                                                                     
defendant during the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy.” Id. 
Compare United States v. Dickerson, 410 Fed. App’x 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding the appellate waiver because there was 
insufficient evidence that the defendant would have pleaded differently had the 
judge not erred during the Rule 11 hearing, but still conducting a factual review 
of the “totality of the circumstances”), with United States v. Johnson, 368 Fed. 
App’x 419, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (ruling that the 
deficiencies in the Rule 11 colloquy were sufficient to make the defendant’s 
appellate waiver unenforceable because it could not be considered voluntary and 
intelligent). 
 174. 616 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 175. Compare id. at 775 (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty without proper 
advice under Rule 11, he may appeal the conviction under at least a plain error 
standard, with relief potentially available where the defendant can show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the 
plea.” (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 
74, 83 (2004))), with id. (“[W]e see no good reason to treat alleged violations of 
Rule 11(b)(1)—concerning advise [sic] and questioning of the defendant—
differently from alleged violations of Rule 11(b)(3)—concerning adequacy of a 
factual basis—when considering the availability of appellate review.”). 
 176. See id. at 777 (describing the colloquy that took place at the plea 
hearing and other circumstances, including the defendant’s education). This 
analysis of “other circumstances” that were on the record but that were not 
reflective of the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error itself indicates the blending of the 
objective plain error analysis with constitutional grounds for appeal under 
Boykin. See also United States v. Sotirion, 617 F.3d 27, 34 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(“Plain error review would not apply if the defendant challenged the knowing 
and voluntary nature of his appellate waiver on grounds independent of the 
district court’s compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) . . . .”); United States v. 
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] defendant who claims that 
he was misled or coerced into entering the agreement, or that he was 
incompetent when he signed the waiver, challenges the validity of the waiver 
itself, not the Rule 11 colloquy. Such a challenge would receive de novo 
review . . . .”).  
 177. See Frook, 616 F.3d at 777 (“[The defendant] has not demonstrated that 
the district court’s failure to advise him of terms in the plea agreement waiving 
the right to appeal, as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(N), affected his decision to 
plead guilty.”). The court examined the defendant’s claim that the district court 
“bullied” him with its “colorful banter” regarding the apparent “tension between 
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“Rule 11 is meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and 
voluntary, and the district court must follow a certain protocol 
designed to achieve that end.”178 Among the U.S. courts of 
appeals that claim to not conduct a complementary voluntariness 
and intelligence inquiry upon a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) violation, the 
Eighth Circuit presides as the court that consistently delves 
deeply into such an inquiry.179 The muddling of the voluntary and 
intelligent requirement with plain error review of the Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) procedural error reflects both the complexity of Rule 
11 as a safeguard for appellate waiver and the obscurity of the 
rationale Dominguez Benitez as courts attempt to apply its 
objective standard to carefully guarded appellate rights.180 
In sum, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits frequently 
include a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry in the plain error 
review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.181 The inconsistent application 
                                                                                                     
Frook’s extensive educational background and his asserted ignorance” about the 
requisite intent for the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Id. at 776–77. Noting 
that “the colloquy simply forced Frook to make a definitive statement about 
whether or not he committed the offense,” the Eighth Circuit ruled that the 
district court colloquy allowed the defendant “ample opportunity to refrain from 
pleading guilty and to proceed to trial if he so desired.” Id. at 777. 
 178. Id. at 775 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see id. (“A 
valid guilty plea that waives non-jurisdictional defects, in other words, must be 
knowing and voluntary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 179. The Eighth Circuit has endeavored to be aggressive in its non-explicit 
evaluation of voluntariness and intelligence of appellate waiver. See, e.g., United 
States v. Slaughter, 407 F. App’x 83, 83 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
(unpublished) (refusing to uphold appellate waiver because of the “minimal 
discussion of the plea agreement and waiver at the plea hearing”); United States 
v. Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 872 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (ruling appellate waiver 
unenforceable because of inadequate colloquy); see also United States v. Andis, 
333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant may knowingly and 
voluntarily enter into a plea agreement waiving the right to a jury trial, but 
nonetheless fail to have knowingly and voluntarily waived other rights—
including appellate rights.”). 
 180. See United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A] 
district court’s failure to comply with Rule 11 calls into question the knowing 
and voluntary nature of a plea, and thus its validity.”); see also Andis, 333 F.3d 
at 891 (“[B]ecause . . . failure to make a determination as required under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)[] can create potential error, a district court should endeavor 
to correctly address any waiver in a plea agreement and ascertain that a 
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights addressed by the 
agreement.”). 
 181. See supra notes 161–163, 170–172, 178–179 and accompanying text 
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of this secondary analysis alongside the Dominguez Benitez 
harmless error standard results in unpredictable outcomes for 
defendants appealing from guilty pleas.182 Due to lacking case 
law and confusion about how far Dominguez Benitez extends in 
general to Rule 11 errors, these circuits claim to apply one 
analysis while actually engaging in another. Their inclusion of 
the secondary inquiry makes it evident that many courts find a 
voluntariness and intelligence requirement at the core of Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) error review.183  
C. Circuits that Apply a Voluntariness and Intelligence Inquiry 
The federal circuit courts that use the additional 
voluntariness and intelligence test for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain 
error review are the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits.184 These circuits add the examination into the 
voluntariness and intelligence of a defendant’s appellate waiver 
because Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors are distinguishable from the Rule 
11(c)(3)(B)185 error in Dominguez Benitez.186 Therefore, the 
objective standard articulated in Dominguez Benitez is 
insufficient alone to review the fundamental nature of an 
appellate waiver.187 
                                                                                                     
(elaborating on the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ application of the two 
tests upon plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors).  
 182. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that inconsistent review by the 
circuits impacts the enforcement of the appellate waivers).  
 183. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that the voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry should be added alongside the Dominguez Benitez standard 
because most of the circuits already engage in the analysis). 
 184. See discussion infra Part IV.C (describing the circuits that apply a 
voluntary and intelligent inquiry to their Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error review). 
 185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B) (“To the extent the plea agreement is of 
the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that 
the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the 
recommendation or request.”). 
 186. See discussion supra Part III.D (presenting the Dominguez Benitez 
standard that a defendant can only show that his substantial rights were 
violated in a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error if he can demonstrate that had the judge not 
erred, he would not have pleaded guilty). 
 187. See discussion infra Part V (advocating for the adoption of the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). 
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Most recently, the Second Circuit clearly established the two-
part framework for a Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error in United States v. 
Cook.188 In Cook, the court initially stated that United States v. 
Vonn189 controls the plain error review standard for all Rule 11 
errors including Rule 11(b)(1)(N).190 However, the court further 
determined that the standard under United States v. Ready191 
was not inconsistent with the Vonn requirements, even though 
the standard under Ready probed the defendant’s understanding 
of the guilty plea.192 By embracing the Ready standard under the 
prejudice prong of Vonn, the Second Circuit expressed favor of the 
additional analysis regarding the defendant’s understanding of 
appellate waiver.193 In Cook, the court reviewed the plea hearing 
colloquy and concluded that the colloquy was sufficient because 
“under the circumstances, there was no realistic possibility that 
                                                                                                     
 188. See United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding 
that the defendant did not establish a “realistic possibility that [he] might have 
misunderstood the nature or source of the waiver” (internal citation omitted)). 
The court noted that the defendant “also fail[ed] to establish plain error for a 
second, alternative reason: he has not shown a reasonable probability that, but 
for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Id. at 482–83 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 189. 535 U.S. 55 (2002); see discussion supra Part III.C (establishing the 
four-prong test for plain error review). 
 190. See Cook, 722 F.3d at 481 (“We are bound by Vonn, which governs all 
Rule 11 appeals, subsection (b)(1)(N) included.”). The court reiterated the four-
part test for plain error and further noted that “[a]dditionally, to show that a 
Rule 11 violation was plain error, the defendant must demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the 
plea.” Id. 
 191. 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 192. See Cook, 722 F.3d at 481 (“In any event, Ready’s ‘knowing and 
voluntary’ test is not at all inconsistent with plain error review: ‘Rule 11 is 
designed to assist district courts in ensuring that a defendant’s guilty plea is 
knowing and voluntary.’” (quoting United States v. Mercado, 349 F.3d 708, 711 
(2d Cir. 2003))). The standard under Ready is whether “the record clearly 
demonstrates that the waiver was both knowing (in the sense that the 
defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his waiver) and 
voluntary.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, although Ready was 
decided before Vonn, Ready’s query into the defendant’s understanding of the 
guilty plea does not conflict with plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N). See id. 
(acknowledging that the two standards do not clash). 
 193. See id. at 482–83 (analyzing whether the defendant understood he 
waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction upon a guilty 
plea, except to appeal a sentence that exceeded sixty months).  
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[the defendant] might have misunderstood the nature or source of 
the waiver.”194 Under this framework, the analysis hinged on 
whether the defendant understood the appellate waiver, not 
whether he showed a reasonable probability that, but for the 
error, he would not have entered the plea.195 
In United States v. Goodson,196 the Third Circuit noted that 
the analysis of the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error was not limited to 
whether there was a technical violation, but also encompassed 
the defendant’s understanding of the rights he waived in the 
guilty plea.197 The court stated that it could not “ignore that there 
was no effort to verify that Goodson understood the breadth of 
the waiver” and that such deficiency constituted error.198 
“[I]nquiry is not limited, however, to whether there was a 
technical violation of Rule 11[,]”199 and the panel continued its 
analysis to determine whether the defendant had shown that he 
did not understand the rights he waived by entering the guilty 
plea.200 The court pushed its review past the harmless error 
                                                                                                     
 194. See id. at 481–82 (stating that the defendant had not shown he would 
not have entered the plea but for the error, yet continuing the analysis as a fact-
specific inquiry into the colloquy). Notably, the court did not reference 
Dominguez Benitez in its opinion.  
 195. See id. at 481 (addressing the defendant’s complaint that “the judge 
failed to advise him of the ‘heart’ of the appeal waiver”); see also Tellado v. 
United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175–78 (D. Conn. 2011) (conducting a 
detailed survey of the U.S. appeals courts’ application of Dominguez Benitez to 
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors and concluding that the Second Circuit would safely fall 
within the circuits that elect to apply the voluntariness and intelligence 
inquiry), aff’d, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 196. 544 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 197. Id. at 540 (determining whether defendant understood the appeal 
waiver, despite the insufficient colloquy). 
 198. See id. at 540 (discussing how the prosecutor’s description of the terms 
of the plea agreement in open court was insufficient under Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
because the court should have asked the defendant “personally whether he 
understood that he had given up substantial appellate rights . . . .”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. (“[W]e must determine whether Goodson, who bears the burden 
of persuasion, has demonstrated that the deficient colloquy affected his 
substantial rights by precluding him from knowing of and understanding the 
significance of the binding appellate waiver in the plea agreement.” (citing 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))). This statement adds the 
objective standard under Dominguez Benitez to the voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry because the court expressly attempted to discern the 
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review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and found that the defendant entered 
the appellate waiver intelligently and knowingly by conducting a 
fact-specific examination of the colloquy.201 
The Third Circuit faced a more deviant colloquy in United 
States v. Corso,202 in which the trial court’s failure to advise the 
defendant about his appellate waiver affirmatively affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights under plain error review.203 
Although the court restated the reasonable probability standard 
as articulated in Dominguez Benitez,204 it did not analyze 
whether the defendant demonstrated that he would not have 
entered the plea but for the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error.205 Instead, the 
court engaged in a fact-specific inquiry based on evidence on the 
record206 that examined the defendant’s depth of understanding 
                                                                                                     
defendant’s actual understanding of the appellate waiver in light of the Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) error.  
 201. See id. at 540–41 (detailing the colloquy, which included discussion of 
the limited circumstances under which the defendant could appeal, the 
defendant’s acknowledgement of the contents of the plea agreement, and the 
prosecutor’s statements about the appellate waiver). The court also noted the 
defendant’s college education and that he successfully committed wire fraud, 
which indicated the defendant possessed a high degree of sophistication and 
intellect. Id.  
 202. 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 203. See id. at 931 (finding that the “near-total deviation” from Rule 
11(b)(1)(N)’s procedural requirements satisfied a showing of prejudice).  
 204. See id. at 929 (providing that, for a defendant to show his substantial 
rights were affected, “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a 
guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under 
Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would 
not have entered the plea” (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 
U.S. 74, 83 (2004))). 
 205. See id. (explaining that the defendant “is obliged to show a reasonable 
probability that the Rule 11 error ‘precluded him from understanding that he 
had a right to appeal and that he had substantially agreed to give up that right’” 
(quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 541 (3d Cir. 2008))). This 
standard as stated in Corso conflates the Dominguez Benitez test with the 
two-part analysis for voluntariness and intelligence, again indicating that the 
inquiry is laden with misperception about the what the Supreme Court intended 
the standard to be for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors given Footnote 10. See supra text 
accompanying note 130 (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 
84 n.10 (2004)). 
 206. See Corso, 549 F.3d at 929 (“We may consult the entire record, and not 
simply the record of the plea colloquy, when considering the effect of the Rule 11 
error.” (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002))). 
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about the appellate waiver.207 Notably, although the court 
determined that the appellate waiver was still enforceable under 
the fourth prong of plain error review, the court found that the 
defendant carried his burden to show his substantial rights were 
prejudiced under the third prong.208  
Following the Second and Third Circuits, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that the defendant’s substantial rights were 
prejudiced in United States v. Murdock209 because there was no 
evidence that the defendant understood the role of the appellate 
waiver in his guilty plea.210 Turning to facts similar to those 
relied upon by the Second and Third Circuits,211 the Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 207. See id. at 930 (“[T]he point of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) is that a signed piece of 
paper is not enough.” (quoting United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 
2007))). The Third Circuit noted that in its previous ruling in Goodson, it 
“addressed some of the considerations that inform our inquiry into whether an 
inadequate Rule 11 colloquy affected a defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. 
(citing United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 541 (3d Cir. 2008)). Compared to 
Goodson, the district court in Corso “made no effort to determine that Corso, 
whose education [was] limited to a GED diploma, understood the effect of his 
waiver on his right to appeal, or even whether he had discussed the waiver with 
his attorney.” Id. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s “fleeting reference” to the 
standard terms of a guilty plea could “hardly be deemed a ‘discussion’ of the 
terms of Corso’s appellate waiver, much less an adequate substitute for the 
missing safeguards of Rule 11(b)(1)(N).” Id. at 930–31. 
 208. See id. at 931–32 (finding the appellate waiver enforceable because the 
defendant did not demonstrate that the “District Court’s deficient colloquy 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings[,]” and therefore failed the fourth prong of the plain error review 
test). The defendant did not carry his burden under the fourth prong of plain 
error review because he did not show that leaving the error uncorrected was an 
offense against the justice system. See id. (“Although the right to appeal is one 
of critical importance to a criminal defendant, we are unconvinced, on the record 
here, that enforcing the appellate waiver in Corso’s plea agreement would result 
in a miscarriage of justice.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
For a discussion of the standards for the fourth prong of plain error review, see 
Edward Goolsby, Comment, Why So Serious? Taking the Word “Seriously” More 
Seriously in Plain Error Review of Federal Sentencing Appeals, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
1449, 1451 (2014) (advocating three new criteria for the fourth prong, to foster 
“a more consistent application of plain error review that will benefit both 
defendants and federal circuit judges”). 
 209. 398 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 210. See id. at 499 (ruling that the appellate waiver was unenforceable). 
 211. See id. at 498 (“[T]he record shows that the judge failed in his duty to 
discuss the meaning of the appellate waiver provision with Murdock, that the 
waiver provision was never mentioned in open court, and there is no evidence 
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noted that the trial judge did not personally determine whether 
the defendant had discussed the agreement with his attorney or 
whether he understood the terms of the appellate waiver.212 The 
court emphasized that the technical violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) 
alone was insufficient if there was evidence on the record of a 
“functional substitute for that safeguard,” but that no such 
alternative occurred.213 The allusion to an alternative procedural 
safeguard was a strong indication that the court aimed to gauge 
the defendant’s understanding of his plea, instead of whether 
there was a reasonable probability that he would have entered 
the guilty plea but for the error.214 Most importantly, the court 
expressly declined to apply the reasonable probability standard 
from Dominguez Benitez.215 By stating that it would “instead” 
                                                                                                     
that Murdock discussed any provisions of the plea agreement with his 
attorney.”). 
 212. See id. at 497 (“[A] defendant’s substantial rights are affected by the 
‘wholesale omission’ of the Rule 11-required inquiry, coupled with the absence of 
any indication on the record that the defendant understood that he had a right 
to appeal and that he was giving up that right.” (citing United States v. 
Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2004))). Neither the prosecutor 
nor the judge referenced the appellate waiver during the plea colloquy, which 
resulted in the court’s complete failure to determine whether the defendant even 
knew the appellate waiver was part of the plea agreement. Id. at 494. 
 213. See id. at 498 (explaining that “some other event could suffice to insure 
that Defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary,” such as the prosecutor 
adequately addressing the waiver provision). The court further stated that “[i]n 
the absence of a discussion of the appellate waiver provision in open court, we 
will not rely on a defendant’s self-assessment of his understanding of a plea 
agreement in determining the knowingness of that plea . . . .” Id. The 
insufficiency of the defendant’s self-assessment stands in stark contrast to other 
circuits that rely on the testimony of the defendant that he understood the 
consequences of the plea, even to uphold the voluntariness and intelligence of 
the guilty plea. 
 214. See id. at 497–98 (noting that in the absence of any open discussion of 
the appellate waiver, the court would not accept the defendant’s self-assessment 
of understanding or the signed statement that he understood the agreement as 
sufficient under Rule 11(b)(1)(N)).  
 215. See id. at 496 (stating that the court “[i]nstead” adheres to the Vonn 
four-prong test). Notably, the Sixth Circuit rejected outright the government’s 
argument that Dominguez Benitez applies to the appellate waiver here. See id. 
(“We decline to adopt the government’s view of this issue, and instead conclude 
that Dominguez Benitez is inapplicable here . . . .”). The court noted that it 
considered the defendant’s appeal of his sentence and not his conviction a factor 
in declining to apply Dominguez Benitez. Id.; see infra note 217 and 
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adhere to the plain error review standard articulated in United 
States v. Vonn,216 the court drew attention to the confusion 
surrounding the line of cases about Rule 11 errors.217 Still, the 
Sixth Circuit’s denunciation of the Dominguez Benitez standard 
implied that it instead adopted a voluntary and intelligent 
inquiry for plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.218  
The Sixth Circuit again focused on the presence of an 
alternative procedural safeguard in United States v. Robinson.219 
In Robinson, the court determined that there was a functional 
equivalent for the Rule 11 advisement because the prosecutor 
referred to the appellate waiver in open court and the defendant 
confirmed he discussed the terms of the plea with his attorney.220 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text (discussing the reasons a defendant may appeal a 
conviction). 
 216. See discussion supra Part III.C (detailing the review standard from 
Vonn for Rule 11 violations). 
 217. The court pointed to the distinction between a defendant appealing for 
the purpose of reversing his conviction (as in Dominguez Benitez) and a 
defendant appealing for the purpose of contesting his sentence term (as in 
Murdock). See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“Instead, we adhere to the rule set forth in United States v. Vonn, which 
instructs us to review violations of Rule 11 for plain error if the defendant did 
not object before the district court.”). While the distinction the Sixth Circuit 
attempted to draw was imprecise and arguably irrelevant, the rejection of the 
Dominguez Benitez standard was expressly apparent. See id. (declining to apply 
Dominguez Benitez); infra note 227 and accompanying text (claiming that the 
distinction between a defendant seeking reversal of his conviction upon a guilty 
plea and a defendant appealing his sentence is not a dispositive factor in plain 
error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors). 
 218. See Murdock, 398 F.3d at 497 (“[A] defendant’s substantial rights are 
affected by the ‘wholesale omission’ of the Rule 11-required inquiry, coupled 
with the absence of any indication on the record that the defendant understood 
that he had a right to appeal and that he was giving up that right.” (citing 
United States v. Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2004))); see also 
discussion infra note 230 (noting the importance of Arellano-Gallegos in 
influencing later cases). 
 219. 455 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 220. See id. at 610 (“[W]here the defendant states that he had reviewed the 
plea agreement with his attorney . . . or where the prosecutor refers to the 
waiver provision in summarizing the terms of the plea agreement, this may be 
sufficient to insure that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.”). Robinson also 
involved a defendant appealing his sentence from a guilty plea. Id. at 609; see 
also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 951 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n the absence 
of such an inquiry by the district court, a prosecutor’s summary of the key 
elements of the plea agreement can be sufficient to prove that the defendant’s 
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Referencing a Rule 11 alternative was evidence that the court 
considered the voluntary and intelligent inquiry a better 
standard of review for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors than the reasonable 
probability standard.221 The court upheld the appellate waiver 
because the Rule 11 equivalent (i.e., the prosecutor’s statements 
on the record) ensured that the defendant entered the plea 
voluntarily and intelligently, not because the defendant did not 
demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge 
not erred.222 
In a seminal and precedential case, the Seventh Circuit 
relied heavily on Murdock to determine that the district court’s 
failure to address appellate waiver violated the defendant’s 
substantial rights in United States v. Sura.223 Involving facts 
                                                                                                     
waiver was knowing and voluntary.”); United States v. Wilson, 438 F.3d 672, 
674 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding the plea agreement voluntary and intelligent 
because “the judge, while directly addressing defendant, instructed the United 
States Attorney to explain to defendant the details of the plea agreement”). 
 221. See Robinson, 455 F.3d at 610 (“Thus, the substitutes for Rule 11 
compliance noted in Murdock are present in this case. The failure of the district 
court to specifically address defendant concerning the waiver provision did not 
affect his substantial rights.”). 
 222. Again, it is noteworthy that the Sixth Circuit panel did not reference 
Dominguez Benitez at all in Robinson, confirming its statement in Murdock that 
it rejected the application of only the objective plain error standard for Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors. See id. (citing Murdock’s plain error review analysis). 
 223. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We 
conclude that Sura’s waiver of his appellate rights was not knowing and 
voluntary.”). The facts in Sura are an exceptional illustration of the importance 
of the voluntary and intelligent test, which is perhaps a reason why the Seventh 
Circuit seized upon this case to delve into appellate waiver. The defendant, a 
convicted felon, was charged as a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, a 
World War II Beretta pistol that he kept as a memento from a friend. Id. at 
655–56. Sura pleaded guilty to the charge, stating “I do have a conviction of a 
felony on my record, I was in possession of the Beretta, so I have to plead 
guilty.” Id. at 656. The district court declined to apply a sentencing reduction for 
the fact that Sura did not possess any ammunition and had never unlawfully 
discharged the weapon. Id. In ruling to vacate the appellate waiver, the Seventh 
Circuit found these facts to be relevant because 
[w]e think it likely that [Sura] would have assessed his strategic 
position differently had he realized that he was losing the chance to 
challenge the district court’s sentencing decision, which was based 
primarily on crimes unrelated to the crime of conviction and gave 
little weight to Sura’s individual circumstances. 
Id. at 662. 
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similar to those in Murdock, the court pointed to the absence of 
any mention of the appellate waiver on the record from either the 
judge or the prosecutor as constituting plain error.224 Echoing 
Murdock,225 the lack of any alternative procedural safeguard 
prevented the appellate court from affirming that the defendant’s 
admission of understanding was sufficient under Rule 
11(b)(1)(N).226 The court explained that a voluntariness and 
intelligence analysis was part of determining whether the 
defendant had satisfied the substantial rights prong of plain error 
review under Dominguez Benitez.227 However, the court hardly 
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. (describing the thoroughness of the colloquy, but noting that 
there was no evidence on the record that the defendant was informed of and 
understood the appellate waiver). The court focused on the facts that the judge 
did not address the waiver in open court or ask the defendant whether his 
attorney advised him of the waiver. Id. 
 225. See id. (mimicking Murdock’s language that “[i]f the safeguard required 
by Rule 11 is missing, the record must reveal an adequate substitute for it, and 
the defendant must show why the omission made a difference to him”). 
 226. See id. (“Sura’s explanation for why he accepted the plea agreement 
gives no assurance that he understood this aspect of the deal . . . .”). The court 
went on to state that based on Sura’s interaction with the judge during the 
colloquy, “he may mistakenly have thought that he had to accept the agreement 
because he was willing to admit to his guilt, when in fact he could have pleaded 
guilty without a plea agreement.” Id.; see United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 
491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the effects of a “wholesale omission” of Rule 
11(b)(1)(N)). 
 227. See Sura, 511 F.3d at 662 (“One step (although not the only step) along 
the way to the defendant’s demonstration that the error affected his decision to 
plead guilty is to look at whether the defendant understood his plea 
agreement.”). The Seventh Circuit’s inquiry contrasts the Sixth Circuit’s 
rejection of Dominguez Benitez because Sura, like Murdock, appealed his 
sentence term, but the Seventh Circuit did not find the sentencing appeal to be 
a dispositive factor. See id. at 655–56 (“Sura now wants to challenge that 
sentence, but in order to do so, he first must convince us that his appeal waiver 
should be set aside.”). Sura in turn requested his plea be entirely vacated on 
direct appeal, instead of only challenging his sentence, and the court conceded 
that the nature of the entire plea agreement was at issue. See id. (“[W]e 
conclude that Sura has shown that he did not knowingly and voluntarily accept 
the plea (including its waiver of his appellate rights) and thus that the district 
court plainly erred when it accepted the plea.”). This outcome illuminates the 
ambiguity of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Murdock, because Murdock rejected 
Dominguez Benitez, but both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits ruled to set aside 
the appeal waiver. Compare id. at 655–66 (noting that Sura’s plea to set aside 
the appellate waiver arose from his attempt to appeal his sentence), with 
Murdock, 398 F.3d at 496 (“We decline to adopt the government’s view of this 
issue, and instead conclude that Dominguez Benitez is inapplicable here because 
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returned to the reasonable probability test after mentioning it, 
instead concentrating on the totality of the circumstances of the 
colloquy.228 Sura established critical precedent regarding 
appellate waiver because the court emphasized the practical 
importance of the colloquy as a safeguard for criminal appellate 
rights, a function that many judges gloss over to preserve the 
finality of a guilty plea.229  
In summary, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits 
expressly incorporated the voluntary and intelligence inquiry into 
plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.230 In particular, the 
                                                                                                     
Murdock is not seeking to reverse his conviction, but merely to void the 
appellate waiver provision in order to challenge his sentence.”). 
 228. See Sura, 511 F.3d at 662 (describing “Sura’s confused responses to the 
district judge’s questions, his age, and his mental condition” as relevant 
considerations). The district court determined that the defendant did not feel his 
medication or psychological treatment would affect his decision and that he was 
satisfied with his representation, but not that he understood his waiver of 
appeal. Id. at 656; see also United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting that the defendant was a practicing attorney with significant 
experience reading and entering contracts, which satisfied the court that his 
appellate waiver was voluntary and intelligent despite the technical Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) violation by the court). Although Loutos involved harmless error, not 
plain error, the Sura court still treated Loutos as applicable law, stating that 
the 
validity of a Rule 11 colloquy is based on the totality of the 
circumstances, including such factors as the complexity of the charge, 
the defendant’s level of intelligence, age, and education, whether the 
defendant was represented by counsel, the judge’s inquiry during the 
plea hearing and the defendant’s statements, as well as the evidence 
proffered by the government. 
Id. at 659 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 229. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating 
that if the court were to “assume that the waiver was knowing and voluntary 
based only on the facts that Sura . . . is literate and signed the agreement, we 
would render meaningless not only Rule 11(b)(1)(N), but also the broader 
inquiry into prejudice that the Supreme Court requires”). See discussion infra 
Part V (discussing constitutional and policy concerns about defendants entering 
guilty pleas with appellate waivers, specifically in light of the concerns the court 
expressed in Sura).  
 230. See supra notes 195, 201, 213, 228–229 (applying the two-step analysis 
to ensure the purpose of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) was maintained and the defendant’s 
rights were protected). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d 794 (2004), is also of noteworthy importance for the 
plain error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors. See supra note 144 (providing 
background on the lack of case law in the Ninth Circuit on this issue and noting 
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Sixth and Seventh Circuits established leading cases and clearly 
articulated the importance of the voluntariness and intelligence 
inquiry to preserve the safeguard role of Rule 11.231 Still, the 
effects and policy behind implementing a voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry on a widespread scale have not been 
adequately explored, even though these circuits present 
compelling demonstrations of how a lower court can easily neglect 
a voluntariness and intelligence examination. 
V. Argument for Adopting the Two-Part Inquiry: The Purpose of 
Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and the Effects of Adding the Voluntariness and 
Intelligence Inquiry 
The circuit split forces appellate courts to weigh the 
efficiency of enforcing a guilty plea, despite a procedural error, 
against the fairness and accuracy concerns that arise from 
imposing a defendant’s involuntary and unintelligent appeal 
waiver.232 This tug-of-war grapples with pertinent issues for a 
criminal justice system characterized by an overwhelming 
caseload and high incarceration rate.233 On the one hand, if 
                                                                                                     
the value of the ruling in Arellano-Gallegos). Various circuits cite to 
Arellano-Gallegos in their analyses under Dominguez Benitez. See supra notes 
157, 158, 212, 218 (citing to Arellano-Gallegos and using the voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry). The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the appellate waiver 
because “[t]he sentencing judge neither ‘addressed the defendant personally’ 
regarding the waiver nor ‘determined that the defendant understood’ the 
meaning of the waiver.” Arellano-Gallegos, 387 F.3d at 797. Importantly, the 
Ninth Circuit used the rhetoric that the other circuits turn to in their 
post-Dominguez Benitez cases. Id. (“Because this was not a technical violation of 
Rule 11, but rather a wholesale omission, and there is nothing elsewhere in the 
record to indicate that Arellano understood the right to appeal his sentence, his 
substantial rights were affected.” (emphasis added)).  
 231. See supra notes 212–214, 228–229 and accompanying text (discussing 
the value of Sura and Murdock in guiding circuits on thorough voluntariness 
and intelligence examination). 
 232. See Cook, supra note 40, at 638 (“[The] federal plea process . . . too often 
devalues individual due process in favor of judicial economy.”). 
 233. See Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/?insrc=whc (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“[T]he 
information-deprived defense lawyer, typically within a few days after the 
arrest, meets with the overconfident prosecutor, who makes clear that, unless 
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courts apply only the objective standard under Dominguez 
Benitez, the likelihood that an appeal will dismantle a plea 
agreement decreases, preserving finality of the conviction.234 On 
the other hand, enforcing an appellate waiver against a 
defendant who has a meritorious claim of misunderstanding 
denies a defendant relief because of an unjust procedural error.235  
In light of these considerations, there are three significant 
reasons to add a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry to plain 
error review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors.236 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly indicated that due process ensures certain aspects of 
the appeals process for criminal defendants, even if due process 
does not guarantee the right to appeal itself.237 Furthermore, 
Congress passed Rule 11 as a procedural safeguard to ensure the 
voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea in the post-Boykin 
period.238 If a court neglects the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) advisement, 
Boykin requires that there be some measure, either at the plea 
hearing or on appeal, to ensure the voluntariness and intelligence 
                                                                                                     
the case can be promptly resolved by a plea bargain, he intends to charge the 
defendant with the most severe offenses he can prove.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 234. See Cook, supra note 40, at 639 (discussing the Supreme Court’s focus 
on finality in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979), “especially in the 
context of habeas corpus challenges to the Rule 11 process”); id. at 635 (noting 
that a mere “technical violation of Rule 11, without more, would not warrant 
collateral relief” (citing Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784)).  
 235. See supra Part III.B (describing the effect of an appellate waiver as 
severely impairing, if not eliminating, a defendant’s opportunity for appeal). 
 236. The argument in Part V focuses on why adding the voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry is pertinent to securing what remains of a defendant’s 
rights after he enters a guilty plea. Importantly, this Note does not argue that 
Dominguez Benitez should not still apply to other Rule 11 errors. For Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors, Dominguez Benitez should apply as a standard for Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors alongside the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry. See 
supra Part IV (detailing the approaches of the circuits and noting that even 
among the circuits that use a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, there is no 
clear consensus on whether such an inquiry is in addition to or in place of the 
reasonable probability standard from Dominguez Benitez). 
 237. See infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text (advocating that some 
degree of due process is required for the appellate process, although due process 
does not guarantee the right to access the appellate process itself). 
 238. See discussion supra Part II.B (detailing the history of Rule 11 and the 
purpose behind the amendments). 
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of the appellate waiver.239 Finally, adding the voluntariness and 
intelligence appellate inquiry offers lower courts guidance when 
administering the Rule 11 colloquy and results in more consistent 
outcomes for defendants, who can receive contrary results in 
different circuits.240 Importantly, many of the circuits already 
conduct a voluntary and intelligence inquiry, whether express or 
not, which is evidence that a number of courts do not consider 
Dominguez Benitez to be sufficient for Rule 11(b)(1)(N) plain error 
review.241  
Although the right to appeal is entrenched in modern society, 
its historical role in the United States is limited.242 Because 
federal access to review for criminal convictions did not exist 
until 1879,243 and states have granted the right to appeal 
sporadically over the last century,244 appeals were not an ancient 
practice in the United States. Dating back to McKane v. 
Durston,245 the Supreme Court has held that the right to appeal 
and the terms of any appeal are within the discretion of the 
                                                                                                     
 239. See infra notes 253–262 and accompanying text (arguing that Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) requires an examination of the voluntariness and intelligence of the 
appellate waiver, making Dominguez Benitez insufficient for review). 
 240. See infra notes 264–269 (discussing the rationale and effects of adding 
the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). 
 241. See discussion supra Part IV (presenting the different approaches of the 
circuits, which generally fall into three main categories: circuits that use only 
the objective test; circuits that claim to only use the objective test, but add a 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry; and circuits that acknowledge the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry). 
 242. See YACKLE, supra note 69, at 66 (discussing the Article III power of 
Congress to “ordain and establish” inferior federal courts with appellate 
jurisdiction, which implies that the founders did not require a federal automatic 
right of appeal for cases outside the Supreme Court’s appellate grant). 
Additionally, the role of the federal courts of appeals is further restrained by 
Congress’s power to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. See id. at 
67–79 (detailing the “cases and controversies” for which Congress can control 
and grant appellate jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts). 
 243. See Harry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment?, 54 JUDICATURE 296, 296 (1971) (“[F]rom 1789 to 1879, a period of 
90 years, a person who was convicted criminally by a federal court had no right 
of review.” (citation omitted)). 
 244. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 1222, 1235 (examining states’ 
adoptions of appeals as of right in criminal cases). 
 245. 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
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state.246 Thus, the argument that access to the appellate process 
is required by the due process clause fails because the right to 
appeal is neither a fundamental right nor “deeply rooted” in 
tradition.247 
However, even if the right to appeal has not earned its place 
among due process guarantees because of its absence in the 
historical narrative of deeply rooted traditions, the Supreme 
Court has still opined repeatedly that some degree of due process 
is required when access to appeals exists through state 
constitution or statute.248 A defendant pursuing appellate review 
                                                                                                     
 246. See id. at 687  
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal 
case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was 
not at common law and is not now a necessary element of due process 
of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to 
allow such a review. 
 247. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 61, at 1238 (“This lack of clarity, 
combined with the Supreme Court’s own refusal to extend due process 
protection to the right of appeal suggests that the Court will be unlikely to 
locate such a right in an originalist conception of historical practice.”); Fins, 
supra note 243, at 296 (“In the light of these historical facts, the earlier holdings 
of the United States Supreme Court that the right of appeal was not part of ‘due 
process of law’ was understandable.”). 
 248. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the appeals process). The 
Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), ruled that when the state 
requires a defendant to produce a transcript with his petition for appeal, the 
state must pay the costs to procure the transcript for an indigent defendant. See 
id. at 19 (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
found that a state violates due process when it provides a first appeal as of right 
but only offers appointed counsel if the defendant demonstrates his claim is 
meritorious. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“When an 
indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right 
to appeal does not comport with fair procedure.”). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52 (1985), the Court ruled that ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 
possible regarding plea bargaining if the defendant demonstrated that his 
counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. See id. at 59 (requiring the defendant to show that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”). Recently, the Court issued 
opinions in Lafler v. Cooper and Frye v. Missouri that further illuminated a 
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining 
process. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (ruling that a 
defendant must show the plea deal would have been extended by the 
prosecution and accepted by the court to demonstrate prejudice for ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining); Frye v. Missouri, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 
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garners due process protection to some extent, but due process 
itself does not require access to an appeals process.249 Notably, 
the Supreme Court stated in Evitts v. Lucey250 that “[a] system of 
appeal as of right is established precisely to assure that only 
those who are validly convicted have their freedom drastically 
curtailed.”251 Although the right to appeal is not a constitutional 
right because “its origins are neither constitutional nor ancient, 
the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct.”252  
The appellate process may exist in a gray area between a 
constitutional guarantee and a statutory entitlement, but its 
central role in the criminal justice process still earned it a 
                                                                                                     
1408 (2012) (deciding that defense counsel has an affirmative obligation to 
communicate a plea offer to a defendant). 
 249. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1970) (ruling that it 
was “not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to Perry’s 
invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge 
against him prior to the trial de novo”). Although access to appellate review may 
not be required under due process, the Court in Blackledge ruled that the 
defendant’s statutory right to seek de novo review was protected by due process. 
See id. at 28 (“[S]ince the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally 
deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first 
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension 
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” (internal 
quotation omitted)); see also supra notes 75–77 (discussing Blackledge in the 
context of constitutional issues that may survive an appellate waiver). 
 250. 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
 251. See id. at 399–400. In Evitts, the Court ruled that although “the 
Constitution does not require States to grant appeals as of right to criminal 
defendants seeking to review alleged trial court errors,” a state needed to 
appoint a lawyer for first appeals as of right if the state has provided for an 
appellate process at all. See id. at 393–94 (stating that the Due Process and 
Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution require that an indigent defendant 
receive appointed counsel to prevent an appeal from merely functioning as a 
“meaningless ritual” (internal citation omitted)). However, in Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court decided that the Constitution did not require the 
extension of the right to appointed counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), to apply to discretionary appeals. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 618 
(determining that discretionary appeals fall outside the scope of required 
assistance of counsel). 
 252. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) 
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 23 (1985) (claiming that the right to appeal is held in 
a special, mostly untouched, trust in America); see also United States v. 
Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The right to appeal, while not of 
constitutional dimension, is nonetheless of critical importance to a criminal 
defendant.” (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977))). 
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carefully guarded place in Rule 11.253 The history of Rule 11 
indicates that Congress amended Rule 11 after Boykin v. Alabama 
in an attempt to ensure the voluntariness and intelligence of a 
guilty plea in general.254 Even though the constitutional rights to a 
jury trial, representation by counsel, and privilege against self-
incrimination255 are still prophylactic aspects of due process in 
criminal proceedings, the increased use of guilty pleas and appellate 
waivers diminishes the function of these rights.256 Because appellate 
waivers have gained popularity in lieu of defendants proceeding to 
trial,257 Rule 11 has assumed an especially important role as a 
safeguard.258 If the court excludes the Rule 11(b)(1)(N) advisement 
or a functional equivalent, then there is likely no precaution to 
ensure the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea and to prevent 
abuse of the appeal waivers.259 Boykin v. Alabama260 requires that 
                                                                                                     
 253. See discussion supra Parts II.B (providing the procedural background of 
Rule 11) and III.B (discussing appellate waiver). 
 254. See discussion supra Parts II.A (analyzing the outcome of Boykin v. 
Alabama and its effect on the guilty plea colloquy, which requires that there be 
an affirmative showing on the record of the defendant’s voluntariness and 
intelligence in entering the guilty plea). 
 255. See discussion supra Part II.A (reviewing the constitutional rights at 
stake in a guilty plea). 
 256. See Dalton, supra note 252, at 63 (“[T]he right to appeal has in practice 
begun to shrink to a mere formality in many jurisdictions as appellate judges 
severely restrict oral argument, deliberate alone, write skeletal opinions, write 
unpublished opinions, affirm without opinion, and in some cases rule from the 
bench.”). 
 257. See Cook, supra note 40, at 628 (“[I]t is tenable to surmise that most 
defendants summarily waive their appellate rights with respect to plea and/or 
sentencing matters without an adequate comprehension of the impact of the 
waiver.”). 
 258. See id. at 632 (“Without more, a meaningful discernment of such waiver 
provisions, and thus, a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of appellate 
privileges, cannot be blithely presumed.”). 
 259. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Here, the 
record does not reveal any substitute for the safeguards of Rule 11 . . . . Rule 
11(b)(1)(N), or its equivalent for plain error purposes, exists precisely to ensure 
that the defendant actually knows what rights he is signing away.”); United 
States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 497–98 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We emphasize that in 
the absence of an inquiry into the appellate waiver by the district court as 
required under the rule, some other event could suffice to insure that 
Defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.”). 
 260. See discussion supra Part II.A (providing the minimum constitutional 
requirements for the court to accept a defendant’s guilty plea in Boykin v. 
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the court verify the voluntariness and intelligence of the guilty 
plea, which must be done at the appellate review if the trial court 
failed to do so.261 The Dominguez Benitez standard of whether the 
record establishes that the defendant would not have pleaded, 
but for the error, is too stringent when compared to the 
constitutional floor required by Boykin and Rule 11’s role to 
protect the defendant’s appellate access.262  
Most significantly, defendants may fare differently in various 
circuits when challenging the enforceability of an appeal waiver. 
Under the strict approach of the Fifth Circuit, a defendant would 
likely be held to his appellate waiver despite the lower court’s 
failure to inquire about the defendant’s understanding of waiving 
the right to appeal his conviction or his sentence.263 
Comparatively, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, an 
appellate court would examine the degree to which the lower 
court discussed the consequences of the waiver with the 
defendant, and specifically the inability to appeal.264 The Second, 
                                                                                                     
Alabama; specifically, the record must show a positive affirmation of the 
defendant’s voluntariness and intelligence when entering the guilty plea). 
 261. See Cook, supra note 40, at 629 (advocating that an “oral explication of 
what was understood, or, at a minimum, judicial implementation of an 
alternative method of discerning defendant comprehension and intent” is 
required to show on the record that the appellate waiver was voluntary and 
intelligent). 
 262. See id. at 637–38 (“The protective ideals evinced by the Supreme Court 
in . . . Boykin, and the congressional intent underlying the 1975 revision of Rule 
11, have been subjected to an array of erosive appellate interpretations.”). The 
reasonable probability inquiry from Dominguez Benitez also imposes a circular 
burden of proof on the defendant because if the record does not contain 
sufficient evidence to appeal under Dominguez Benitez, it is likely because the 
judge did not conduct a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry on the record.  
 263. See discussion supra Part IV.A (developing the stringent objective 
approach of the Fifth Circuit under Dominguez Benitez, in which the Fifth 
Circuit only searches for evidence that the defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty had the judge not erred). 
 264. See discussion supra Part IV.C (describing the circuits that adopt a 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry to satisfy Rule 11 and Boykin 
requirements). Additionally, the First Circuit explicitly acknowledged the 
potential difference in outcomes in United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 
11 (1st Cir. 2008), in which the court attempted to distinguish the facts of 
United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2007), from its own case. See supra 
notes 159–163 and accompanying text (noting the factual differences between 
Borrero-Acevedo and Sura, and implying that there was a set of circumstances 
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Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ opinions reflect a 
comprehensive expectation that the lower court endeavor further 
into colloquy and at minimum discern the defendant’s education, 
family history, and mental stability.265 These circuits encourage 
questions that require active participation from the defendant to 
prevent the colloquy from turning into a sham or farce composed 
of leading questions.266 Furthermore, a defendant’s admission of 
guilt at the plea hearing is questionable if the court did not 
advise him of the waiver, potentially making his own affirmance 
irrelevant.267 While lower courts are not required to subscribe to 
a scripted dialogue, the variations of the standard of review 
prevent trial judges from having the uniform understanding that 
                                                                                                     
in which the First Circuit would venture to the degree of the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis). See also United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(analyzing whether there was a “realistic possibility that [the defendant] might 
have misunderstood the nature or source of the waiver”); United States v. 
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the court could not “ignore 
that there was no effort to verify that Goodson understood the breadth of the 
waiver”); United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
the application of Dominguez Benitez to Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error). 
 265. See supra note 228 (providing factors that courts examine when 
determining voluntariness and intelligence); discussion supra Part IV.C 
(presenting the circuits that incorporate a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry 
into their Rule 11(b)(1)(N) reviews by examining the transcript of the colloquy 
and personal factors about the defendant to determine whether he understood 
the appeal waiver). Furthermore, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ 
acknowledgment of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry indicates that 
these courts recognize the value of a further inquiry, but have struggled to apply 
it as expressly as the circuits in Part IV.C. See discussion supra Part IV.B 
(noting that the circuits in this category acknowledge and even employ the 
voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, but that they still explicitly cling only to 
the Dominguez Benitez standard). 
 266. See Wheeler, supra note 26, at 317 (articulating “Suggested Questions 
for the Court to Ask in Taking a Guilty Plea” that require active participation 
from the defendant); Cook, supra note 40, at 615 (recommending judges turn 
away from leading questions during plea hearing colloquies because of the same 
concerns that support Federal Rule of Evidence 613). 
 267. See United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2005)  
In the absence of a discussion of the appellate waiver provision in 
open court, we will not rely on a defendant’s self-assessment of his 
understanding of a plea agreement in determining the knowingness 
of that plea, even where, as the government emphasizes is the case 
here, the defendant is sophisticated or has significant experience with 
the criminal justice system. 
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their plea colloquies should garner whether the defendant 
voluntarily and intelligently waived his access to the appellate 
process.268  
In addition to concerns about consistent outcomes, norms of 
the justice system such as finality, fairness, and accuracy are 
improved by adopting the voluntariness and intelligence 
inquiry.269 Adopting the secondary inquiry for appeal of Rule 
11(b)(1)(N) errors will provide the lower courts with guidance to 
ensure that guilty pleas are not overturned on appeal, thus 
enhancing finality.270 Engaging in a deeper colloquy may sacrifice 
a minimal degree of efficiency at the trial level, but guilty pleas 
are already the archetype of efficiency in the justice system.271 By 
contracting with a defendant to waive his constitutional rights, 
fairness and accuracy are principles of the justice system that 
become vulnerable during plea bargaining.272 The appellate 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 5 (discussing 
the dynamic opinion issued by Judge Kane in United States v. Vanderwerff); 
United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89812 (D. Colo. June 28, 
2012), rev’d, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). In Vanderwerff, the district court 
rejected the defendant’s appeal waiver, despite the defendant’s prayer for the 
court to enforce the waiver to achieve his plea deal. Id. at *10. On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court’s rejection of the appeal waiver was 
an abuse of discretion. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d at 1272. Judge Kane elaborates on 
his adamant rejection of the appellate waiver in Vanderwerff in his article about 
guilty pleas and the modern justice system. See Judge John L. Kane, Plea 
Bargaining and the Innocent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 26. 2014, 1:05 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-
innocent#.J0tAIr9bW (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“My question then is this: am I 
and my fellow jurists doing enough each day to replace the mindless practice of 
assembly-line plea bargaining with a process that is based on integrity and that 
aspires to justice rather than succumbs to the cynicism of convenience?”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 269. See Vanderwerff, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89812, at *8 (“Indiscriminate 
acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the ability of appellate courts to 
ensure the constitutional validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and 
reasonableness in sentencing decisions.”). 
 270. See Wheeler, supra note 26, at 306 (“A more comprehensive guilty plea 
inquiry . . . makes good practice from both the defense and prosecution 
perspectives . . . . Convictions obtained on the basis of such inquiries are more 
likely to withstand appellate review.”). 
 271. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”). 
 272. See id. at 1397 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that the plea bargaining 
process “presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively 
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process is necessary for preserving accuracy and the ability to 
recreate results given the amount of discretion awarded to judges 
in sentencing and prosecutors in charging.273  
VI. Conclusion 
Under the two-part framework that includes Dominguez 
Benitez alongside a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry, the 
defendant must show evidence that he did not understand his 
appellate waiver at the time he entered his plea. Dominguez 
Benitez is still useful on appeal because if the defendant satisfies 
the objective but-for test, he likely also satisfies the voluntary 
and intelligence examination; however, the same cannot be said if 
the tests are reversed. Together, the objective test under 
Dominguez Benitez and the voluntariness and intelligence review 
encourage trial courts to establish detailed records of the 
colloquy, which is required under Boykin. The voluntariness and 
intelligence inquiry still requires a stringent showing from the 
defendant that his substantial rights were affected, but it further 
urges the lower courts to conduct a more thorough colloquy. 
The Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits present cases 
in which the two-step inquiry is a workable standard capable of 
producing different outcomes than review under the purely 
objective standard.274 The possible difference in outcomes under 
the current ambiguity is sufficient to validate due process 
concerns that unless there is a voluntary and intelligence inquiry 
at the guilty plea colloquy, there is no mechanism to ensure the 
defendant’s understanding of the appellate waiver. Furthermore, 
adding a voluntariness and intelligence inquiry alongside the 
objective standard for review of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) errors resolves 
the tension between finality, efficiency, and fairness. The 
                                                                                                     
compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a 
lesser offense”). 
 273. See Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 5 (“The 
defendants must then choose between the risk of being found guilty at trial and 
getting a longer sentence than the alleged crime would warrant or a guilty plea 
in exchange for a lighter sentence.”). 
 274. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the line of cases that apply the two-step 
inquiry). 
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addition of the voluntariness and intelligence inquiry is not 
overly burdensome on the courts, will not affect finality of guilty 
pleas negatively, and protects appellate rights as a principal 
safeguard in the criminal justice system.  
